Georg Simmel

Georg Simmel: Great impressionist of social life

German sociologist Georg Simmel covered a broad range of microscopic as well as macroscopic topics, order as well as conflict, economic phenomena as well as art. He favoured a rather light and essayistic style, but his insights were far from superficial. His eye was the eye of the impressionist. He had a great talent for generating original ideas and highlighting the typical. This chapter will cover only some topics of his highly variegated oeuvre and observe the typical way in which he approaches the social.

4.1 A rich life and a poor career

Georg Simmel was born on 1 March 1858, in the centre of Berlin. Georg had five elder sisters and one brother. His father, Edward Simmel, was a wealthy merchant from Sephardim-Jewish descent, who turned to Catholicism. In 1838, Edward married Flora Bodstein. She came from a Jewish family that had become Protestant. Their children were baptized as members of the German Evangelical Church. Edward Simmel established a business in Berlin, which later developed into a renowned chocolate factory. Edward Simmel died in 1874, when Georg was 16. Music publisher Julius Friedländer, a friend of the family, became his guardian and stimulated his love of music. When Friedländer died, he left his entire fortune to his protégé.[1] As a child, Georg was a bit of an outsider. His relation with his dominating mother was rather distant and his brother and sisters did not share his strong interest in intellectual affairs. Later, he complained that there was not much of a cultural climate in his family, although this can hardly be true, for he received his first piano lessons from his sister Marie.

At the University of Berlin, Georg studied history with Mommsen, ethnic psychology with Lazarus and philosophy with Dilthey, Harms and Zeller. At the age of 23, he presented a thesis on ‘psychological-ethnological investigations into the birth of music’, but this thesis was rejected. The professors found his topic rather strange and too broad. Instead they asked him to present his study about Kant’s views on the essence of matter as a PhD thesis. For this study he already had received a prestigious award. Though this procedure was exceptional, Simmel gladly accepted this way out and got his doctor’s degree after all.[2]

Two years later, Simmel presented his Habilitationsschrift,[3] on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, but it was rejected. At the official event of the dissertation lecture, Zeller criticized Simmel for having a blind spot for the human soul. Instead of politely answering this critical remark Simmel turned the event into a scandal by claiming that Zeller held nonsensical ideas about the soul.[4] Simmel had to try again and finally succeeded in 1885.

In the same year, he became a private lecturer at the University of Berlin. This meant that he had to earn his income by asking money from his students. Fortunately, his lectures attracted many students. He inspired them to think creatively about a rich mixture of topics. He was a virtuoso at the platform. Whenever Simmel wanted to express the core of an idea, he so-to-speak picked it up with his hands, his fingers opening and closing; his whole body turned and vibrated under the raised hand. This gave the students the feeling that they participated in an authentic thought process. Moreover, they found his perspective on modern times fascinating.[5] So, it is no wonder that students enjoyed his lectures. The drawback was that he formed a threat for tenured professors. Some envied his oratory skills and others realized that Simmel could also outshine them academically.

His lectures about logic, ethics, aesthetics, sociology of religion and social psychology became cultural events that were announced and reviewed in the Berlin newspapers. They also attracted many foreigners and non-academics.[6] Simmel allowed women to attend his lectures, long before women officially were allowed to study at German universities. It is highly probable that his feminist attitude has harmed his academic career. Another reason could be that he tended to ignore the rules of the game. Simmel often addressed himself to a non-academic audience, in particular to members of Berlin’s counter culture of artists, authors and other intellectuals. He often used a non-academic style, leaving out all marks of scholarship such as references and footnotes. 

In 1890, Georg married Gertrud Kinel, daughter of a railway engineer. Gertrud birthed one son, Hans Eugen. He became professor of Medicine in Jena. He fled to the usa after Hitler came to power. Gertrud Simmel was a fascinating woman. She studied philosophy and published four books under the pseudonym Marie Louise Enckendorff. Georg and Gertrud received many renowned guests and their wives, turning their house into a cultural centre.

Georg Simmel has written more than twenty books about a great variety of topics and themes, such as the philosophy of Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and the work of famous artists like Goethe, Rembrandt and Rodent. In his philosophy of culture and art he discussed themes like the portrait, the caricature, the landscape and the Alps. He published books on religion, morals and the philosophy, psychology and sociology of money. Besides, he wrote about 200 essays on epistemology, cultural philosophy and metaphysics. Four of his books are viewed as landmarks of sociology.

The first was his book on social differentiation (Über soziale Differenzierung). It was published in 1890, three years before Durkheim published his book on the same topic. For Simmel, individual differentiation is an outcome of the growing expansion and density social groups. This creates more room for individual differences. He assumed, like Durkheim, that in pre-historical times, humans were very much alike. Simmel stressed that this homogeneity is strengthened by a great hostility to other tribes. This brings him to the following interesting hypothesis: “The closer the synthesis within the own tribe, the more pronounced the antithesis against other tribes.”[7] It appears to work the other way around too. If we replace tribe by ethnic or religious group this hypothesis still stands most tests in our own day and age.

In 1892, Simmel published his reflections on the demarcation between sociology and history. He made perceptive remarks about the methods of explaining social and historical events and processes. Some of these ideas were adopted and further elaborated by Max Weber.[8] The last of his four major sociological books, published in 1908, is Soziologie.[9]

Simmel’s impressive oeuvre never seemed to suffice for a full professorship. No doubt, the anti-Semitic climate in Germany harmed his career. That his parents had converted to the Christianity offered no real defence, nor did his complete assimilation in the German bourgeois culture. Even an attempt to appoint him as an extra-ordinary professor failed. Two years later, in 1900, the faculty successfully repeated the request. But this did not improve his academic status and power, for only full professors had a real say in university politics. When a leading historian was asked to evaluate Simmel’s qualifications for the chair at Heidelberg, he wrote to the Culture Department of the state of Baden:

“He is … a dyed-in-the-wool Israelite, in his outward appearance, in his bearing and in his manner of thinking. … He spices his words with clever sayings. And the audience he recruits is composed accordingly. The ladies constitute a very large portion.”[10]

Such comments were lethal, because they suggested that he was a second rate scholar who attracted a second rate audience. Simmel did not become an embittered man. He enjoyed the recognition and respect of eminent professors such as Edmund Husserl, Heinrich Rickert and Max Weber and was admired by renowned journalists and artists. He was honoured to give the opening speech at the first national congress of the Association of German Sociologists.

Finally, in 1914, he was appointed as full professor in Strasbourg. The academic status of this outpost ranked far below that of the universities of Berlin and Heidelberg. That same year the Great War broke out. Immediately, Simmel lost his scientific objectivity and impartiality. He got inflicted with strong patriotic feelings and became a fierce nationalist. His friend, Ernst Bloch, said to him: “Your whole life you have evaded the (political) position and now you have found the utter position in the trenches.”

Simmel asked Bloch to leave the house. Three years later he realized that the policy of Kaiser Wilhelm II was catastrophic.

In 1918, Simmel fell terminally ill, he asked his doctor how much time he had left. The latter told him that there was little time left. He immediately withdrew from social life to write his last book on metaphysical perspectives.[11] Simmel died of cancer on the 28^th of September 1918, sixty years of age. At his own request only his wife and his dear friend Gertrud Kantorowicz were present at the funeral. Son Eugen was on the battlefield.

Ferdinand Tönnies evaluated Simmel’s work as an outstanding sociologist. He spoke of the “magical versatility of his highly skilful thought” and contended that this insightful man would leave profound traces in the field of sociology. He also asserted that Simmel’s mind was totally set upon analysis.

“No matter how many remarkable examples his profound erudition marshals in support of his fine differentiations, he prefers to seize upon completely timeless, general problems, such as subordination, conflict, secret societies, self-preservation of the social group and the development of individuality. These are all significant objects and he treats them with a multiplicity of charming observations, brilliant insights and blinding dialectics; but he never fully attains the recognition that the most proper objects of sociological inquiry are the social structures (Gebilde) which arise out of the thoughts of men themselves, out of their subjects.”[12]

This last critical remark is open for debate and will be discussed when we focus on Simmel’s idea that life not only engenders life, but ‘more than life’.

4.2  Sociological knowledge

Simmel’s sociological writings are based upon assumptions that determine the scope and limitations of his sociology.[13] Like Kant, he assumes that no reality is directly accessible to human cognition. Sensual impressions may create pleasant or unpleasant sensations and may influence the cognitive process, but they are not identical with knowledge. To achieve a coherent insight into reality rather than diffuse feelings requires a specific cognitive effort. Observation does not suffice for apprehending reality. Understanding presupposes a two-fold process of differentiation. To begin with one has to recognize oneself as a knowing subject, as a thinking subject that can differentiate and apprehend reality as a series of objects. Knowledge begins with seeing oneself as a subject and an also an object.[14] The cognition of the ‘I’ dialectically evolves into the cognition of the other, the cognition of things outside oneself. The recognition of oneself as an object constitutes the first a priori condition of any cognitive effort. It recognizes the existence of the individual as real. It gains significance because the conscious affirmation, ‘I am’, becomes the blueprint for the awareness that ‘things are’. The same statement also serves an epistemological function. To discover ego as an object is to discover the differentiating power of a category. If it is possible to experience oneself as an object as well as a concept, to set oneself apart from oneself, then any reality outside the subject can be subjected to the same process. The absoluteness and steadfastness of individual existence are foundations of man’s cognitive discoveries.

For Simmel, life itself is the ultimate reality. Life is first and foremost realized in man himself. All further experiences and cognitions can be related back to the ‘original’ first experience and cognition of the ‘I’. Thus, for Simmel, social cognition and social experience ultimately rest with the individual. Any social event, even the most complex one, can be traced back to him. Even objectified social structures and cultural systems do only become real if they are lived and apprehended by individuals.[15]

The second step in cognition also contains an ontological and a categorical aspect. The ontological statement ‘something is’ remains confined to the knowing subject, for reality can only be felt, experienced and imagined.[16] There is no purely logical access to reality. There are only pragmatic reasons for assuming that reality is ‘real’. Humans are faced with the problem of survival. We must know our natural environment well enough in order to tackle the problems that endanger our species. We have, as Simmel puts it, practical and theoretical interests in the realities of which we are part. The necessity to know and to act compels us to follow these procedures. To act and to theorize means to make decisions, to select among countless facets of reality. We have to construct a framework of values to get a cognitive hold on the apparent chaos of impressions and experiences. Values are superimposed upon reality because their selective and discerning power serves our interest. Yet, we add nothing to reality. Reality itself exhibits a wealth of properties and aspects that offer us the opportunity to attach values to them. Hence, the possibility of evaluation is the second a priori of human cognition.

The discovery of ego leads to the discovery of alters. However, the others are not purely and objectively perceived as separate, autonomous individuals, but rather as individuals that are viewed from certain perspectives relevant to ego. In other words, the other is evaluated, whether it is a person, animal or thing. In the case of persons we apprehend them in a typified way. We focus on their role, class, status, gender, ethnicity or lifestyle. The cognition of the ‘you’ is therefore always the cognition of social association. Although experience teaches us that other people are more complex and different from the way we classify them, we still relate to them as to a typified object.[17] We always sell them short. They are much more than we tend to think.

Simmel started with the individual as the knowing subject. For him to gain knowledge is an eminently social effort. The evaluative categories have their origin outside us. They are reflections of properties of our social environment. We know about other persons by rediscovering in them the same individualistic existence we experience in ourselves and we recognize them as participants in a common social environment. But this image of the other is not completely determined by the norms and standards of our society. As cognitive subjects we can choose from a variety of available values, norms and standards, but we will do so in accordance with our own abilities, practical necessities and theoretical interests.

Knowledge entails more than sets of cognitive contents about objects. Expanding or revising our knowledge also is an ongoing process of discovery and investigation of relations between things, processes and structures. Through the apprehension of these relationships we construct a unity between otherwise unconnected elements. Such cognitive constructions are ‘true’ in a relativistic and pragmatic sense. It is only from the pragmatic perspective that elements of reality are perceived as related.[18] They serve as temporary ordering principles that are to be modified or abandoned as soon as their heuristic purpose is served. All this is terribly important. It is here that the social actors and their interests tend to merge. Individuals, forming groups and associations, integrate into larger entities. At the same time, they are the bearers of the interests that govern such larger social units. Our interests no longer remain outside social reality, but enter into it. Hence, it is from here that cognition of societal phenomena must start.

“The processes of cognition … proceed under these, not abstractly conscious, but very fundamental conditions that express themselves in the reality of praxis: That the individuality of each one finds a place within the general social structure, indeed, that the structure beforehand, despite the unpredictability of the individual, is directed at this achievement.”[19]

At this point, Simmel postulates a third a priori, one about mediation between society and the individual. This leads to a normative statement about society; it forms a very important basis of his theory of modernity. In direct reversal of the philosophy of the Enlightenment he postulates that there is no equality between the elements of a society. We can only grasp the diversified structures of modern society if we consider many facets and diverse qualities of human beings. Neglecting the uniqueness of individuals will turn sociology into a schematic objectification and metaphysical ossification of society.[20] 

The goal of sociology is now established: it is the search for the numerous processes that shape and are shaped by the relationships between individuals. These processes and relationships compose social reality. They change and develop further as time goes on. Simmel’s whole sociological work is focused on the mutual effects of individuals and historical situations upon each other.

Scheme 4.1      Simmel’s 3 epistemological a priori’s

4.2.1      Historical knowledge

For Simmel, the kind of understanding which is peculiar to social history is embedded in our view of understanding in general. There are fragmentary, prototypical traces of our intellectual activities in the forms and procedures, which the mind develops in order to satisfy the practical demands of life. These fragmental and prototypical images of the past are conditions for the continuation of life itself. Life would be utterly inconceivable without some awareness of the past. The fragmentary consciousness of the past depends upon analysis and synthesis of the material of life.[21]

Insight into historical understanding is depends upon insight into understanding people in general. How can one person understand another? Ultimately our understanding of Julius Caesar, George Washington, Mahatma Gandhi or Nelson Mandela is essentially the same as understanding a colleague or a friend. Understanding has the structure of an integral synthesis of two elements. There is a given object, an empirical phenomenon that, as such, has not yet been understood. The second mental element is the interpretative idea of the subject. Subjects may develop their own ideas or interpretative conceptions or their ideas might be taken from another source. There are three forms of this cognitive relationship between an object and an understanding subject. In the first form the observable activities and expressions of an individual are understood as being motivated. We suppose that an animate mind lies ‘behind’ all the observable actions of the other. We assume that she or he is not a puppet, but a real person who – under certain conditions – can be understood from within. We believe that we understand the behaviour of another person when we can impute certain experiences, feelings, motives and ideas into the other, because we have had similar experiences, feelings, and motives. The understanding of the properties of a historical person or someone from another culture is understandable if there is an essential identity between us.

We are obliged to infer the mental states of another from the appearance of external signs. The little child heard himself crying when it was in pain. Solely on these grounds it could infer that another person who is crying must also be in pain. The same inference can be made in similar cases. When children grow and get older they draw conclusion from the actions of other people based on their observations of the whole person. It is not just the observer’s eye that sees or his ear that hears, but the entire person is involved. But even then, this perception of the total existence is far from complete. It is fragmentary and open to correction. It is susceptible to stimulation and suggestion. Nevertheless, it is the fundamental and uniform mode in which one person approaches, perceives and influences another.[22]  

Historical understanding is only an alternative form of our understanding of the contemporary. The way to the creation of a complete picture is more taxing. The result will be less complete than the picture we can construct of contemporary events. In this case we can question living persons about forms of behaviour that we do not understand. But even then the picture will never be complete and perfect.

4.3  The field of sociology

In his essay ‘The Field of Sociology’, Simmel tried to explain what sociology is all about.[23] At the time, there was a host of opinions concerning its contents and aims. Even the meaning of society was disputed. Existence was viewed as an exclusive and concrete characteristic of individuals, their qualities and experiences. Society, by contrast, was considered as an abstraction and not seen as a real object. Even today some theoreticians think that society does not exist outside and in addition to the individuals and the processes among them. Others, like Simmel, state that all what people do and certainly all what they do during interactions with each other, is determined by society and forms part of social existence. So, any science of human beings also is a science of society. Hence, in principle, sociology ought to replace the artificially compartmentalized disciplines, such as history, psychology and moral philosophy. But, according to Simmel, nothing is gained with this broad definition. It only sticks a new label on a pot filled with a variety of already well-established disciplines.[24]

4.3.1      Sociology between methodological individualism and holism

Like Durkheim, Simmel strongly rejected the arguments of the methodological individualists. If it were true that only individuals are ‘real’, historical science would reach its goal only if it included the behaviour of each individual. Yet, even if we could satisfy such a fantastic claim, we would not have solved our problem how to interpret, for instance, how ‘the Greeks’ and ‘the Persians’ behaved in the battle of Marathon. The notion of ‘the Greeks’ and ‘the Persians’ constitutes a totally different phenomenon, which results from a certain intellectual synthesis and not from a direct observation of isolated individuals. Despite their individual variations, they had enough in common to form the more comprehensive units of ‘the Greeks’ and ‘the Persians’.

Simmel did not think it wise to rob our cognition from all such synthetic concepts. It would deprive human knowledge of its most legitimate contents, such as our grasp of the main characteristics of a political movement, a nation or a religion.[25] The method of reduction would not uncover useful insights into the characteristics and actions that are typical of social groups or societies. This inclination to look for a solid ground for our cognition in the basic elements of social units does not lead anywhere. Besides, it is completely arbitrary to stop the process of reduction at the individual, for also the individual is a composite of various qualities, destinies, forces and biographical derivations, which, in comparison to the individual himself, have the same character of elementary realities as do the individuals in comparison to society.[26]

On the other hand Simmel did not shy away from studying the actions of individuals, either as theoretically pure examples of specific types or as unique, famous historical personalities, such as Michelangelo, Rembrandt, Goethe, and Schopenhauer. His aim in the study of these great personalities is always to disclose the inner unity, its essence, formula or destiny of the soul that underlies the diverse contents and expressions of the subject’s life.[27] For Simmel, the ego has two layers. The core is hard or impossible to change. It carries the real sense or substance of our life and gives it coherence and unity. The other one is composed of momentary impulses and isolated irritabilities. The more heterogeneous the peripheral contents, the stronger the appearance of the inner unity.[28]

Many sociologists like to stress that the work of great artists and scientists is the result of the activities and energy of a collective. They like to remind us of the famous statement of Isaac Newton, saying that the only reason why he could see further into the unknown regions of nature was because he had climbed on the shoulders of those giants of science that preceded him. Merton and other sociologists of science emphasized that science can only progress if a host of people help to pave the way for their invention or discovery. In their eyes the so-called individual genius only succeeds in synthesizing or rendering a new perspective on material at hand, material produced by other scientists. From a sociological perspective all these remarks are valid. Nonetheless, they appear to play down the role of outstanding scientists, artists, philosophers or political leaders. Other artists, philosophers or scientists had been walking along the same paved way, but this did not help them to produce path-breaking new methods, theories, ideas or a new style of art. Simmel is convinced that the work of great philosophers, scientists and artists is more a function of the personality than of the historical setting or the spirit of the times. Their work not only is receptive, but also a creative expression of really individual genius. Therefore, it has historical as well as a-historical elements. The latter elements give them their great value. The historical elements, such as particular techniques, choice of topics and perspectives that are typical for a specific period, are of little or no consequence. Though Simmel has rejected the individualistic approach to culture in other domains, he considered the history of philosophy or the history of art as the histories of really great thinkers, writers, poets, painters, composers and sculptors. They constitute forms of hero worship.[29] But this worship should not become excessive and expand itself to all personal belongings, characteristics and experiences of these great philosophers or artists. The personality, which is at stake here, is exclusively the person who appears in his work, the author of these ideas or works of art. We understand the philosopher insofar as we understand his philosophy,[30] but sociologists tend to be more interested in the inner unity, essence, form or function of social bodies and processes.

4.3.2      Sociation, the subject matter of sociology

             In der Wechselwirkung gerinnt etwas zu Gesellschaft

For Simmel the subject matter of sociology is the world of symbols and forms of interaction. Society is something individuals do, experience, enjoy and suffer. Society is an intricate web of a variety of social relations between regularly interacting individuals; it’s not a ‘substance’. It’s nothing concrete, but an event.[31] So, the subject matter of sociology is sociation, in other words the specific forms and patterns of human interaction, and their crystallization into characteristics of groups and collective processes. Hence, sociologists should focus on the effects of collectives upon the individual too. Sociology should study everything that leads people to associate themselves with other people, such as the need for social intercourse, love, and respect. Such drives, and the practical need for knowledge or the hunger for power, constitute social reality. These psychological needs form the ground material (stuff) for the process of sociation, the process of constituting the social. Sociation proper, the process of constituting social processes together with or in company of others, in a cooperative or conflictive way, really starts when being next to each other evolves into being together, interacting together, in being with each other, for each other, against each other – in being of some significance for each or other. Sociability, the need for companionship, the drive to interact with other people, to be with other people, to respond to their actions, leads to social forms, functions, patterns or structures that make society a real society that is an organization of associated people.[32]

Whatever the drive to associate with other people, whatever benefits one derives from the interaction with other people, there is also a price to pay. You can’t always do as you like in the company of others. You have to hide some aspects of your personality. People have to learn to restrain themselves, to postpone gratifications and to be tactful; otherwise they cannot function well in groups. People avoid badly socialized individuals as much as possible. They will minimize contact by ignoring their presence, by reluctantly responding to or entirely ignoring their requests or remarks.  

Simmel envisioned a sociology that predominantly deals with psychic facts, but it does not do so in order to discover the laws of psychic processes. Rather, the aim is to grasp the manifold forms of human interaction. These various forms of interaction, these modes of reciprocal influence and mutual interpenetration are phenomena of a special kind. We must reach the essence of society by studying the crystallized and observable basic forms of the more fleeting encounters between individuals; structures such as tribes, castes, classes, business companies and voluntary associations. The frequent, repetitive, and rather intensive interactions Simmel has in mind when he talks about ‘society’ are crystallized as definable, consistent structures such as the state, the family, the church, and other kinds of social organizations based on common interests.[33] But there are numerous less conspicuous forms of relationships and kinds of interaction that also need to be studied. Think of the secret rendezvous, the flirtation, the joyful greeting, the exchange of gossip, the humorous wink of the eye, or the nod of approval. Taken singly, they may appear negligible, but together they produce society. Therefore, we should not confine ourselves to the large social formations, like the first anatomists confined themselves to the major organs such as the heart, the liver, the lungs, and the stomach. Later generations of anatomists learned that the innumerable unknown tissues were just as crucial for a living organism as the more familiar ones.[34]

Sociation continuously emerges, ceases and emerges again. People are incessantly tied together by the whole spectrum of relations that connects them. These ties may be momentary or permanent, conscious or unconscious, fleeting or long lasting. Even where the eternal flux and pulsation of sociation are too weak to form associations, organizations and political movements, they link individuals, in such a way that they influence each other. The interactions of the ‘atoms’ of society account for all the toughness and elasticity, all the colour and consistency of social life, that is so striking and yet so mysterious.[35]

4.3.3      Method  

Simmel denounced both the essentially organistic approach as the intangible, immaterialist or idealistic perspective. The supporters of the latter approach were deeply convinced of the unique character of historical events and the individual capriciousness of humans. They found each attempt to study social processes like natural sciences a waste of time. Simmel acknowledged that all humans are unique social beings with individual volitions. Therefore, he saw a great need for a specific sociological perspective. But this approach had to supersede the traditional explanations in terms of purely individual actions or divine interference. For him, the science of sociology consisted in the abstraction of certain elements from historical reality and in their recombination for the analysis of specific cases. That the social or sociological standpoint is not perfectly clear yet, is no objection, it is a characteristic of the human mind to be capable of erecting solid structures while their foundations are still insecure. When it comes to the most general and the most profound of intellectual problems, it is the rule – and not the exception – that the ‘foundation’ is less secure than the superstructure erected upon it. Scientific practice, especially in new areas, cannot do without a certain measure of intuition and purely instinctive advance. As the sciences move on, by trial and error, by conjectures and refutations, they will gradually weed out false assumptions and misguided conclusions.[36] Step by step they will penetrate deeper in reality and reveal new insights. Naturally, scientific work must never be satisfied by vague, instinctual procedures and ideas based on intuitions. Yet, one would condemn science to sterility if one made a completely formulated methodology the condition of taking even the first step. This is all the more true for the study of the infinite complexity of social life.[37]

Simmel stood at the start of the road to a systematic and truly scientific sociology. So, the fragmentary, essayistic and incomplete character of much of his work should not be held against him. On the contrary, he is convinced that even small fragments of culture can reveal many valuable insights into the culture as a whole.[38] Therefore, fragments should not be mixed up with basic elements because even fragments possess many characteristics of the whole of which they are a part. Apparently, Simmel thinks that it is possible to create a theoretically valid image of reality on the basis of a few loose fragments, in the same manner as famous archaeologists succeed to create a lively image from prehistoric societies on the basis of a thorough analysis of a few pieces of broken pottery and some figurative scratches on a rock. Simmel boldly contended that a well-trained eye could detect very much, if not all of the entire aesthetical beauty of a work of art, from a careful observation of each section of a work of art.[39] Of course, not everyone would agree to this last bold statement, but we can agree that we can learn a lot from fragmented evidence.

4.4  The sociology of forms

Several authors have confessed their bewilderment over the seemingly unsystematic and generally vague manner in which Simmel handles his concepts and theories. Consequently, they have called upon a patient and tenacious scholar to compile a list of all the instances where Simmel uses the concept of ‘form’. It was hoped that this procedure would unearth the general meaning of this term as intended by Simmel. However, so far, it has not produced a consensus among theorists. Wallisch-Prinz takes quite another route. She is convinced that the right meaning of ‘content’ and ‘form’ can be deduced from his epistemology.[40] To Simmel, the forms and contents of life are fluid and inextricably interrelated. Human life produces certain states in which it expresses and realizes itself. Its scientific approach started with inventing simple techniques and procedures for gathering food and building shelters. In a long historical process these techniques, customs and rites have been tested and developed into modern science, technology, works of art, religions, laws and innumerable other forms. These forms encompass the flow of life and provide it with content and form, with freedom and order. Although these forms arise out of the process of life, they acquire a logic and lawfulness of their own. This places them at a distance from the ‘spiritual’ dynamic which created them and which makes them independent. Herein lays the ultimate reason why culture has a history. Social life ceaselessly creates forms that become self-enclosed and demand permanence. These forms are inseparable from life; without them it cannot be itself.[41] They have their source in ‘values and concepts that do not lie within life itself’. Life as such is unintelligible. This is why we need conceptual constructs to understand aspects of life, to understand the various structures or forms of social encounters between individuals.

4.4.1      The epistemological basis

Aspects of reality can only be grasped as possible objects of experience and knowledge if they fit an existing frame of reference, that is, if they fall under a category, taxonomy or other conceptual scheme that performs an epistemological function. For example, science, history, art and religion are forms in the sense that they specify conditions under which it is possible to have a certain kind of experience and acquire a certain kind of knowledge.[42] Social knowledge is only possible if the manifold human actions and experiences are structured in such a way that specific aspects can be distinguished, such as politics, demography, economics, religion, science, technology, war and peace. Likewise, within the historical domain, different periods must be discernable such as Antiquity, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the Age of Industrialization. Periods of growth and progress, stagnation and decline are experienced, observed and cognitively digested within each lifetime. Some other examples of forms are superiority, submission, competition, specialization, solidarity and exclusion. These and similar forms may be exhibited by the most diverse groups and the same interest may be realized in very different forms.

The theory of history synthesizes discontinuous, fragmentary and discrete data into continuous wholes. However, the continuity of this synthesis, for example the interconnections between various styles of classical European music, cannot be derived from reality. The observed continuity within ‘the romantic period’, which connects Wagner, Chopin, Liszt and Brahms, is an exclusive property of the historical construct itself. Romantic traits can already be found in the music of Beethoven, who treated the rigid and traditional forms of classical music rather freely. Hallmarks of the Music from the Romantic period are flexible modulations, a broad range of tones, the use of new instruments such as the saxophone and a more frequent use of changes in timbre and tempo. All this was aimed at making music more sensitive and more imaginative to reflect magic, tragedies, great love affairs, dreams and even the mysterious underworld of the human psyche. History fractures “the real continuity which subsists within any given temporal process.” Consider distinctions such as Gothic and Renaissance, revolution and reaction. These distinctions destroy the smooth transition of life itself.[43] These theoretically constructed distinctions make reality intelligible. Perhaps this becomes clear when I define history as a socially constructed perspective on a sequence of interrelated events that theoretically can be discerned from social events in other periods. Without the awareness of sequences of related but discernable periods with their own typical events and characteristics there would be no consciousness of history at all, but only a dull and infinite stretch of events.

History and the social sciences are no mechanical reproductions of the real properties of given data: Just the opposite. They invent, construct and further develop this raw conceptual material in conformity with the theoretical purposes of knowledge. ‘Sociological or historical truth’ is an intellectual activity or function. It transforms objects into something new, because we have confronted the raw data with new questions. Thus we discover new meanings and values. These meanings and values transform the data into a structure that satisfies the criteria that we impose upon it.[44]

4.4.2      Life as a form that produces more ‘more than life’

Simmel gave the concept of life centre stage in his approach. However, there is a very important difference with the approach of Wilhelm Dilthey and Henri Bergson. They emphasized the vitalistic principle, that is, the dark sides and hidden powers of organic life, its irrationalities and its continuity. But they tended to ignore that life can also crystallize and produce structures, forms and functions that seem to halt the continuous flow of life. Certainly, life is in a state of perpetual flux. It is constantly creating, increasing and intensifying its own potentialities. The essence of life is to produce ‘more life’. That is ‘to produce, reproduce and renew life’. But life also has the capacity to transcend itself by creating new forms, new stable structures that are ‘more-than-life’. Although these entities are products of life, they develop characteristics that are independent of life and often go against the strain of life. On the other hand, they tend to be rather crucial for social life.[45]

Simmel offered many illustrations of the manner in which life creates ‘more-than-life’. For instance, the biological instinct for reproduction has evolved into various forms of love – passionate love, romantic love, marital love and polygamy. But the same biological instinct also has lead to rape, arranged marriages, marriages of convenience, extra-marital affairs and prostitution. In a similar way the vital need to gather practical knowledge, essential for our survival, has produced advanced mathematics, rocket science and many other sciences as an autonomous form. This vital origin has evolved in a specific form in which statistics and methodology have become autonomous fields. In a similar vein, particular specializations, for instance astrophysics, have become totally detached from the human capacity to adapt to their earthly environment. The origin of all scientific forms, for example economics and politics, can be traced to the energies and exigencies of life and its disposition to recreate itself. The same is true for the arts. In general it is true that we see for the sake of living and survival, but for great painters like Rembrandt, Van Gogh and Picasso it is the other way around. They lived for the sake of seeing. Some forms can only exist when other forms constitute them. Language is a necessary condition for the constitution of literature and poetry. These sublimated forms of language can be viewed as unintended artefacts of primitive forms of verbal communication that originally evolved as another instrument for survival. This too is an example of a form engendering a new form, language producing more-than-language as soon as people discovered the aesthetic power of sound patterns, rhythm, rhyme and the attraction of stories full of events that never could happen in real life.

4.4.3       Different contents, similar forms; similar contents, different forms

The world is structured by a multiplicity of forms, but many different forms may embrace the same content. In optics, blue is a wavelength; in modern songs blue symbolizes sadness; in religious symbolism blue represents heaven. So, the same concept can represent a physical fact, a mood, aesthetic evaluation or a religious allusion. Form and content are merely conceptual means to structure our knowledge. Analytically they can be separated because the same content can be put in different forms. This is not only true for colours, liquids, gas or clay, but also for numerous cultural phenomena. The plot of a story can be put in a short story or a lengthy epic saga. It can be presented in a poem, a play, movie, opera or musical. In reverse, the basic form of a story, the beginning, the main part and the end can be found in a large variety of other cultural products, such as scientific reports, presidential addresses, jokes and sermons.

There are innumerable forms of social interaction, such as attacking an enemy, leading a business firm or organizing a conference or a concert, that seem to be very different from one another. Nonetheless, they all require serious planning and co-operation. Simmel was convinced that it was feasible to discover similar patterns or forms in conflicts within families, governments and business organizations, because in all these situations imbalances of power play a major role. He aimed to discover generally valid knowledge about the laws that govern these social forms.

“Events which might be widely divergent in their bearing on life as a whole may nonetheless be quite similar to one another; or they may be incommensurate in their intrinsic meanings but so similar in respect to the roles they play in our total existence as to be interchangeable.”[46]

Simmel used the terms form, interaction and function indiscriminately. He talked about functional relations between individuals or groups, sociological functions, functions as pure form, unity of interaction and so forth.[47] He was an enthusiast advocate of an approach that focused on a restricted number of existing forms that are constituted by social interactions. He certainly did not deny that specific historic events were unique and irreversible, such as the assassination of Julius Caesar, John F. Kennedy, Olof Palme or Anwar Sadat. But he asserted that it was possible to observe, describe and analyse the similarities between certain aspects of various historical events that could be generalized. Hence, he was not interested in King George or Queen Anne, but in King George and Queen Anne. He wanted to abstract from the concrete content of actual social situations and events and zoom in on the general form, just like geometry does not study the real and rough circles we encounter in nature, but the mathematically pure models of circles.

Another example is that of the similarities of behavioural patterns within dogmatic religious groups, political ideologies and philosophical schools of thought.[48] Members of these sectarian movements think that they are endowed with special knowledge, convictions and insights unknown and incomprehensible to the rest of the world. Therefore, they exclude themselves from the world to devote their life with the greatest intensity to their particular doctrines. Newcomers present another example. Many sociologists have observed a high degree of similarity in the behaviour of military recruits, freshmen and immigrants. They show the same kind of insecurity. They share the same kind of unfamiliarity with their new surroundings. They anxiously search for helpful signs

Unlike Weber Simmel never used the term ‘ideal type’, though he did use ‘pure type’ and ‘pure form’. For Weber the adjective ‘pure’ or ‘ideal’ referred to a concept that is constructed in the most rational and pure way. For Simmel, it had a similar meaning, but it also meant theoretically pure, in other words, a theoretical form that is severed from its content.[49] If he would have used the term structure instead of form, he would have been better accepted by later sociologists. Modern sociological terms like status, role, norms and values as elements of the social structure are closely related to the conceptualization used by Simmel.

4.5  Simmel’s sociology of social types

4.5.1             The Stranger and the adventurer

The stranger is not a passing traveller, but someone who has arrived from a foreign region or country and stays in our midst for a long time. He cannot be accepted fully because he has not been a member from birth. There is no collective memory regarding a multitude of events that have occurred during his youth; events that all others members of the group have experienced and can relate to. Moreover, the “native” members of the group will always keep in mind that once the stranger might return to his home country. Often strangers will surprise us with their peculiar and rather detached view on our behaviour, because they come from a very different culture. As the strangers in our midst are both near and distant, they can easily act as mediators. Their approach to the conflict at hand will be more objective and neutral because they have not completely identified themselves with one of the parties. Also, they will be bothered less by the prejudices that exist in each of the conflicting groups. Further, it is striking that people will confide things to strangers that would be rather risky if told to acquaintances.[50]

What is an adventure? What sets it apart from continuity and the wholeness of life? Simmel compared the adventure with a work of art and describes what makes the adventure or the work of art stand out from normal experiences or common products of craftsmen, bookkeepers or bakers. ‘Wholeness of life’ refers to the fact that a consistent process runs through the singular components of life, how crassly distinct they may be. What we perceive as an adventure appears to stand in stark contrast to that interlocking of life-links, to that feeling that all our experiences, after all, weave an unbroken thread. Nonetheless, an adventure is certainly a part of our existence, adjacent to other occurrences which precede and follow it; at the same time, however, in its deeper meaning, it occurs outside the usual run of affairs. Yet, as a foreign element in our existence it also is somehow connected with the centre.[51]

Each segment of personal experience bears a double meaning: it revolves about its own centre, contains as much breadth and depth, joy and suffering, as the immediate experiencing gives it. At the same time, it is a segment of a course of life – it is both a circumscribed entity and an experience that is connected with a series of other experiences. Yet, to the adventurous experience we ascribe a beginning and an end much sharper than those to be discovered in other forms of our experience. Thus, the adventure is given a special meaning in and of itself. It seems to be wholly independent of the before and after.[52] The more adventurous the adventure is, the more dreamlike it becomes in our memory. If non-adventurous people accidentally get involved in an adventure, they will often romanticize it as something experienced by someone else. After a while, they will find thir experience hard to believe.

Adventurers are people who like to experience completely new situations. From time to time, they want to escape from the normal routine. But they also want to come back to tell everybody what exceptional phenomena they have encountered during their adventure. While an adventure falls outside the normal context of life, it falls, at the same time, back into that context. In some respects adventurers resemble artists and gamblers. Artists want to cut a piece of the endless chain of experience. They want to detach it from all connections and give it a self-contained form as though their work of art is defined and held together by an inner core. It is an attribute of both the work of art and the adventure that they represent a part of existence, yet in both the whole of life is somehow comprehended and consummated. Moreover, works of art and adventures are perceived to exist entirely beyond normal reality.

Adventurers and gamblers are strongly inclined to flitter around chance. They like to risk all, their entire fortune and even their life. They drive into the mist, as if the road will lead them, no matter what. This is the typical fatalism of adventurers and gamblers. The obscurities of fate are certainly no more transparent to them than to others, but they are sure that their adventure or gamble must succeed, which justifies their actions. Moreover, as fatalists they believe that nobody can escape his fate. So, why should one worry? Yet, they are certain of their success. Adventurers rely to a large extent on their own strength, but above all on their own luck. For gamblers, we can observe the same thing, though in their case it is a strong but unwarranted trust in an unbeatable combination of wit and luck. Hence, it is no wonder that to moderate persons adventurous conduct often seems to border on insanity.

The decisive point about the adventure, its specific nature and charm, is that it is a form of experiencing. The content of the experience does not make the adventure. That one has entered unknown territories, faced mortal danger, bankruptcy or conquered an attractive man or woman for a short span of happiness– none of these are necessarily adventures. They become adventure only by virtue of a certain experiential tension whereby their substance is realized. Only when the peculiar colour, ardour and rhythm of the life-process become decisive, only when they, as it were, transform substance – only then events change from mere experience to adventure.

4.5.2             Group size: dyads and triads

The simplest sociological formation operates with two elements. Many general forms of “sociation” are realized with this form. The limitation to two members determines several forms of interaction and solidified relationships. A thorough analysis of the dyad is highly relevant, fort some of its major characteristics are the same for various twosomes. Some of these features remain constant even if the two members are collectives such as states or business organizations. The fundamental difference between the dyad and larger groups is that the two elements have a quite different relation to each other than they have to all other people. Each of the two feels confronted by the other, not by a collective above them. Larger groups will continue if one of its members dies or leaves the group, for a dyad this means the end. For its life it needs both participants; for its death, it needs only one. This fact is bound to influence the attitude of the individual toward the dyad.

Characteristics of the triad are different. The appearance of the third party indicates transition, conciliation and abandonment of absolute contrast. Of course, on occasion, the third participant can also introduce or incite contrast, but he or she can be replaced. In the most significant of all dyads, monogamous marriage, the child as third element, often has the function of holding the unit together. Even in our present time, in which divorce is widely accepted, a fair number of couples that no longer love each other decide to stay together until the children are considered old enough to cope with their parent’s divorce. Not so long ago, only childbirth would make a marriage complete and impenetrable. The birth (or adoption) of a child tends to strengthen the union of the two and to enhance their mutual love. The relation of the spouses to the child produces a new and indirect bond between them, because it will reveal new aspects of their character, morals and worldview. It leads to the common preoccupation with the new-born child. Even if the marriage ends in divorce, a marriage with children will never really end. The child will always be a reminder of the other parent.

If the third party really is an outsider, he or she can act as a neutral mediator when the other two are engaged in a conflict. The unbiased mediator can show each party the claims and arguments of the other, without the accusative, embittered or aggressive tone of the other. This can be of a great help in solving their conflict because the wrong pitch can easily arouse negative feelings and worsen the problem. Nothing serves reconciliation of conflicting parties more effectively as does objectivity, that is, the attempt to limit all complaints and requests to their objective contents. Curtailing the subjective personal tone is a necessary condition to reconciliation. To put it psychologically, antagonism of the will has to be reduced to antagonism of reason. Though, we should not be so naïve that mediators will be capable of solving all conflicts between warring parties, they certainly help in many cases. Recently help of a mediator has become more popular when the marriage is at risk. Mediation also helps solving conflicts between neighbours, especially in urban districts with many people from a variety of ethnic and cultural origins.   

4.5.3             Group size: individuality and social structure

Simmel took a great interest in the correlation between the expansion of a group and the level of individuality. His central hypothesis is:

“Individuality in being and action generally increases to the degree that the social circle that encompasses the individual expands.”

Social differentiation proliferates when groups or associations get bigger. What once were minimal differences in dispositions, preferences, abilities and affinities now are accentuated by the increased necessity of competing for a livelihood with more and more people. In a Darwinist way, competition develops the special abilities of the individual in direct ratio to the number of participants.[53] Thus, new solutions to the problem of survival are bound to appear. As soon as societies grow, a rudimentary form of social classes will emerge. A social divide arises between high and low, as a simple consequence of the natural alliance of the weak against the strong.

“After the process of social differentiation had led to separation between classes or status groups, the mere formal fact of occupying a particular social position creates among the similarly characterized members of the most divers groups a sense of solidarity and, frequently, actual relationships.”[54]

If emancipation is unthinkable, as was, and to a high degree still is, the case for the members of the lower castes in India, this obstructs the creation of bonds between members of different castes, religions and ethnic groups. 

Simmel assumed that in each person there is, as it were and unalterable ratio between individual and social factors; the narrower the circle to which we commit ourselves, the less freedom of individual ‘deviations’ we possess. However, this narrower circle is itself something ‘individual.’ It cuts itself off from all other circles precisely because it is relatively small and unique. When the circle in which we are active enlarges, there will be more room for the development of our individuality.[55] But as parts of this larger whole we are more common and have less uniqueness. The larger whole is less special as a social group. In other words, the elements of a distinctive social circle are undifferentiated and the elements of a circle that is not distinctive are differentiated. Examples of the first case we can find in religious sects such as the Quakers, the Amish or the Hara Krishna. As soon as members of a modern society enter the sect of Hara Krishna, they will adjust their clothing, hairstyle, food pattern and whole lifestyle to the prevailing norm in this sect. So, it appears that they have peeled of their individuality. But, as soon as they go out into the streets to chant, beat the tambourine and try to convert other people they draw anyone’s attention because they stand out in the crowd. Thus, they are unique or special only in collective matters. Within the sect their life and mentality is strongly regulated.

Similar patterns can be observed at the macro level. Simmel mentioned the local orientation of the citizens of New England in North America. From the beginning, the Protestant immigrants or Pilgrim Fathers founded communities in which the individual was restrained by his obligations to the collective. Although this unit was relatively small, it was also self-sufficient. By contrast, loners populated the Southern states. There, the first immigrants did not come as members of a religious group or community, but as single adventurers. These somewhat adventurous and anarchistic individualists formed a colourful bunch of people that was not predisposed to local self-government. The Southern states developed large provinces as administrative units.

The difference in political structure between a highly centralized France and a loosely federalized Germany inspired Simmel to quote the following remark of a Frenchman about the mania for clubs in Germany:

“It is this that accustoms the German, on the one hand, not to count solely on the state; on the other hand, not to count solely on himself. It keeps him from locking himself up in his particular interest and from relying on the state in all matters of general interest.”[56]

To this he added Bismarck’s assertion that there was a much more narrow-minded small-town provincialism in a French city of 200,000 than in a German city of 10,000, because Germany was composed of a large number of small states. Apparently the very large state allows the local community to have a certain mental self-sufficiency and insularity. In a smaller state, the local community can view itself more as a part of the whole.

In stark contrast to Durkheim, Simmel never felt the urge to move away from psychology. He assumed that humans have a psychological sensitivity to differences. But it is a dualistic drive. People also want to belong to a social circle, to be part of a whole and, to a large extent, to be similar to other people. Our existence is, as it were, the sum of two: an individual and a collective existence, a unique and a shared one. Simmel assumed that we have a particular amount of the tendency toward individualism that we either have to realize within our own group as personal individuality or as a member of a rather distinct group, that is, as collective our personality to the affiliation with specific groups, we distinguish ourselves from the broader mass.

The family as a social unit offers its members a preliminary differentiation that prepares them for differentiation in the sense of individuality; on the other hand, the family offers members a shelter behind which that absolute individuality can develop until it has enough strength to stand up against the greatest universality. Sociologically, the family has a double role. On the one hand, it is an extension of one’s own personality, a unit through which one feels one’s own blood circulating. On the other hand, the family also constitutes a unit within which individuals distinguish themselves from all others and develop a selfhood. This double role of bonding and separating, of integration and segregation, unavoidably results in the sociological ambiguity of the family: sometimes it appears as a unit that acts as an individual and at other times it appears as an intermediate circle that intervenes between the individual and the rest of society or the surrounding social circle.[57]

4.6  The tragedy of modern culture[58]

According to Simmel inner conflicts appear in each person as soon as life develops beyond the purely biological level to the level of the mind and culture.   

“The entire evolution of culture consists in the growth, resolution and re-emergence of this conflict. For clearly we speak of culture when the creative dynamism of life produces certain artefacts which provide it with forms of expressions and actualisation and which in their turn absorb the constant flow of life, giving it form and content, scope and order: e.g. civil laws and constitutions, works of art, religion, science, technology and innumerable others. But a peculiar quality of these products of the life process is that from the first moment of their existence they have fixed forms of their own, set apart from the febrile rhythm of life itself, its waxing and waning, its constant renewal, its continual divisions and reunifications. They are vessels both for the creative life, which however immediately departs from them and for the life, which subsequently enters them, but which after a while they can no longer encompass. They have their own logic and laws, their own significance and resilience arising from a certain degree of detachment and independence vis-à-vis the spiritual dynamism which gave them life. At the moment of their establishment they are, perhaps, well-matched to life, but as life continues its evolution, they tend to become inflexible and remote from life, indeed hostile to it.”[59]

The emergence of these new forms, these new cultural artefacts – self-sufficient and with an inherent claim to permanence – give culture a historical character. Life, social life, flows on without pause, but the emergence and disappearance of distinct forms give structure to the history of culture and society. Sooner or later, the forces of life erode every cultural form that they have produced. The perpetual dynamism of life comes into conflict with the crystallized forms it has produced. This nature of the process of cultural history was first observed with economic developments. Marx spoke of historical materialism when he described that the economic forces of any age give rise to an appropriate form of production: slavery, the guilds, feudalism and free wage-labour. When they arose, they were the adequate expression of the capacities and aspirations of that particular age. But, from time to time new economic energies will surface that cannot find adequate scope in existing forms. Therefore, they will gradually or abruptly replace old forms by new ones.[60]

For Simmel, it was the essence of form to claim, the moment it is established, a more than momentary existence not governed by the pulse of life. This can be seen even more clearly in intellectual spheres. So, from the outset there always is a latent tension between objective cultural forms and (social) life. Cultural pessimists believe that this could produce a pervasive malaise in which all forms come to be felt as something imposed on life. This virus of cultural pessimism always tends to find its most eager victims among intellectuals. This belief in a downward spiral only holds true if we overlook the possibility that counter movements could be triggered and spontaneous innovations could emerge that would gave history a more positive twist.

4.6.1             Objective and subjective culture

Simmel always showed a strong interest in objective cultural products, in crystallized externalizations or products of psychological and social interactions. Precisely these cultural products make that people can understand each other, that they can talk about them and start into relations because they share an affinity or a great dislike for them. Thanks to these objectified cultural products, – common ideas, shared feelings, wishes and desires that have resulted in professions, organizations, customs, laws and concrete artefacts – sociologists can observe and analyse behavioural patterns of people and understand why some relations emerge and survive while others fall apart.

Objective culture is the domain of objects that function as instruments for the socialization of people or as conditions under which they can become social or cultural beings. These objective cultural forms are incorporated into the mind of the individual. However, not all elements of objective culture enter into the subjective culture of individuals. This is particularly true for modern societies. The works of great writers have enriched our language. During many centuries, new concepts, shades of meaning and individual modes of expression have been added. Also the mixing with people from other countries, regions, cultures and classes has added new forms of expression.

“Yet if one looks at the speech and writing of individuals, they are, on the whole, becoming increasingly incorrect, undignified and trivial. As for content, during the same period the range of subjects for conversation has objectively increased considerably as a result of advances in theory and practice, yet it seems as if conversation, both social and intimate and letter-writing are much more superficial, boring and frivolous now … How many workers today, even in smaller-scale industries, understand the machine with which they work, that is to say, the intelligence that is embodied in the machine? … As regards the purely intellectual sphere, even the most knowledgeable and thoughtful men operate with an ever-increasing number of ideas, concepts and statements with whose precise meaning and content they are only every imperfectly familiar.”[61]

It is clear that Simmel deplored the fact that individuals no longer were able to appropriate all the knowledge and all the meanings that have been produced by mankind, that they cannot understand all the intelligence and meaning that is hidden in modern machines, buildings, organizations, computer systems, procedures, rituals, traditions and customs, nor all the theories and their applications that have been discovered, invented and further elaborated by numerous generations. But this has to be accepted as a fact of life. Our practical existence is and can only be a fragmentary one. Now this is even truer then more than a century ago, when Simmel was writing this down. Since then Letter-writers have become an endangered species. And to date more than 99 per cent of users of social media have no or very little idea, myself included, of the awesome applied science behind its electro-technical workings. 

There will always be a discrepancy between the high spirits of a group and the daily actualised culture and lifestyle. Only very small, undifferentiated and pre-modern societies form an exception to this rule. There the objective cultural potential will not outstrip actual subjective culture. Here we see a strong parallel with Durkheim’s theories about “primitive societies” as being cemented together on the basis of mechanical solidarity and an almost complete overlap between collective and individual consciousness. Things seem to go awry as soon as the division of labour starts to stride forward into numerous directions. Then, we no longer understand, only in a very simplified and limited way, what and how other areas of industry are producing. Specialization enhances not only alienation of the workers from their products, but it also stimulates division of social categories and diversification of norms and values, giving rise to all kinds of subcultures, objectified in differences in clothing between social groups– a topic that has been picked up, further elaborated and made topical again by Pierre Bourdieu.

Once again, we stress that Simmel had a special and typical elitist German view on culture and the education (Bildung). For him, the real tragedy was that all available knowledge and art all of the objective culture, as many individuals, including those of former generations, have formed it, bridles the cultural development of men in such a way that they cannot become the men they should have become. Nonetheless, objective culture goes on using the energy of the very individuals that are being frustrated in their intellectual, spiritual, artistic and physical growth, so that they will never reach the height of their true selves.[62]

We have to accept that our subjective culture is limited. The real problem lays in a highly undesirable discrepancy between objective culture and the individual when the objective culture emerges as an autonomous form that seems to control individuals and to hinder their emancipation. Four conditions appear to be essential for the reification of objective cultural forms. Firstly, the existential content of some area of life – science, religion, politics, art or love – is expressed in specific artefacts of a cultural form such as prescribed methods, rules, specific apparatuses, measures, safety procedures, buildings, et cetera. Secondly, this form becomes an independent entity, self-contained and developing according to its own immanent principles. Thirdly, it becomes estranged from the energies and interests that were originally invested in it. Finally, the development of this form outstrips the ability of the individual or even groups of individuals, to master or control it. They cannot even incorporate these artefacts within their own personal culture or mindset. If this is the case, then we can speak of reification.[63]

Simmel, echoing Marx, contended that this might give rise to feelings of oppression and pessimism. For example, more and more, we realize that we cannot master nor escape the ever changing reified world of science, technology, politics and the economy. We have become sceptical about the so-called progress that is promised with every new discovery or invention. Nevertheless, these cultural forms are necessary conditions for the expression and realization of the energies and interests of life. On the other hand, these same forms become increasingly detached from life, which can give rise to a tension or conflict between the process of life and the configuration in which it is confined. Ultimately, such a tension can lead to the destruction of the necessary condition for these social processes.[64] For instance, laws and regulations that are invented to make social existence more harmonious, just, safe and predictable, laws and regulations that are intended to avoid or solve conflicts often create new and unforeseen problems. In many essays, Simmel has documented this conflict between life and form, for example between the authentic religious experience of the believers and the dogmatic rules of the Church or between the creative, academic aims of scientists and the highly rationalized division of labour in the academic world at large.

In an ever-modernizing world cultural artefacts become more complex, refined, systematic and complete. But, the process of integrating these new cultural forms in the live of the individual does follow suit. Hence, they become only partially incorporated in the subjective culture of individuals. So, on the one hand, objective culture depends upon the activity of individuals who create things that express the energy of their lives. On the other hand, objective culture becomes increasingly self-contained and self-perpetuating. Nonetheless, although forms of objective culture such as governmental rules and regulations have a tendency to evolve into autonomous and self-contained empires, they can never reach the limit of a total separation from subjective culture. There will always be a mutual relation between objective and subjective culture, between the collective spirit of the times and individual minds.[65]

Objective culture: equality and the guillotine

4.7  The social construction of poverty

Most contemporary sociologists will accept that only few people have become impoverished, purely because of individual fate, stupid investments or other unintelligent decisions. Following Marx, they tend to stick to the idea that whole categories of people are poor and get even poorer as a result of a combination of unfavourable economic, social and political conditions that amount to oppression and exploitation. Simmel focused on completely different aspects of poverty, its causes and its impact. In fact, he mainly analysed the position of the poor in relation to society and the social functions of helping the poor. For Marx, poverty was a deplorable situation that crippled the lives of many innocent people, but it also is a situation that could be used as a lever for a revolution by mobilizing their frustration and anger.

4.7.1             Labelling the poor

For Simmel, the poor emerge when society recognizes poverty as a special status, as people requiring assistance. It is only from the moment that some official organization or some voluntary association starts to help the poor that they become part of a specific category. In his view, a collective labelling process that gets objectified by actual support keeps this category united. Poverty cannot be defined in itself as a quantitative state, but only in terms of the social reaction resulting from a specific situation. In Simmel’s view, poverty is a sociological phenomenon that refers to people who occupy a specific economic position within the whole; but this social position is not determined by this fate and condition, but rather by the fact that others attempt to correct this condition.[67] In fact, this goes even further, because such systems tend to make a sharp distinction between the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ poor. For instance, in the USA widows with children tend to be viewed as ‘deserving’ poor, whereas single teenage mothers often are labelled as ‘undeserving’ poor, because they behave in an irresponsible way.[68] 

I think that Simmel would have reacted positively to V. S. Naipaul’s sharp observations of India. In 1962, when Naipaul visited the land of his ancestors for the first time, he could never overlook the fact that India was shockingly poor. He found the squalor revolting. But later, when he returned for the second or third time, he also observed:

“The smiles on the faces of begging children, that domestic group among the pavement sleepers waking in the cool Bombay morning, father, mother and baby in a trinity of love, so self-contained that they are as private as if walls had separated them from you; it is your gaze that violates them, your sense of outrage that outrages them.”[69]

In countries where begging is a normal occupation, beggars believe that they have a right to receive alms. This idea might be underlined by religious rules or duties. For instance, Muslims are obliged to give alms to the poor. To them, zakat is a sign of piety and a means for receiving God’s grace.[70] In a secular world the beggar addresses his demands to the individual on the basis of the solidarity of mankind. Where aid to the poor has its raison d’être in the organic link between all members of society or between all humans, the rights of the receivers are more strongly emphasized than when it is based on religion. Then the obligations of the givers are stressed. In the latter case, the motive for alms resides exclusively in the significance of giving for the giver. Then almsgiving represents no more than a form of ‘good works’ which paves the way to heaven. Simmel hypothesized that the rise of begging in the Middle Ages was a consequence of the senseless distribution of alms. Arbitrary donations to the poor undermined all creative work, so instead of helping the needy, the givers only helped themselves by giving themselves a good feeling and a higher self-esteem.

Simmel was rather cynical about assistance to the poor. In his view, a view shared by many more sociologists, the rich only give aid to the poor to keep them quiet, hoping that this will prevent them from stealing, robbing or killing. The angst that the poor will become active in a destructive way has been a strong impetus for the establishment of welfare systems. Giving aid to the poor is not an end in –itself. It is not intended to end poverty per se, but first and foremost, it is aimed at maintaining order and safeguarding the well being of the better off.[71] Family members tend to assist each other too. Not all help is given for the sake of the recipient, but to prevent that the family loses its good reputation. Simmel also remarked that the aid that English trade unions grant their unemployed members is not given to alleviate their hardship, but primarily to prevent them to accept work more cheaply, which could result in lower wages for the entire trade.[72]

Members of a social group that are labelled as poor find themselves as being seen as a kind of outsiders. In cases like this, being outside is only a particular form of being inside. This twofold position of the poor can also be found in several other situations. In social groups in which being literate, are married and have a job is the norm, being single, illiterate or unemployed, puts you in awkward position of belonging but also no-longer really belonging. No matter how much individuals may contribute to group life and no matter how strongly their personal life may be tied to the group, by putting members in a specific class or category, they are placed apart from the rest. The existence of such twofold positions is a basic social fact. Finding oneself simultaneously inside and outside becomes more frequent and more visible as the group expands. When social groups expand they acquire an independent status that dominates the individual. Collectivism makes individual persons into objects, into different objects. It treats the poor and the rich differently. Assistance, to which the community is committed in its own interest, makes the poor into objects of the activity of the group and places them at a distance from the whole.[73] This divide can be emphasized by giving the poor assistance, but also be denying them certain civic rights, e.g. denying them the right to take part in general elections as was common in 19^th century democracies or, to take a more recent example, denying the right to marry a spouse from a foreign country if you do not earn enough income to guarantee that your partner will not become dependable of social assistance. Like Durkheim we could say that the poor are defined as deviant people to help the middle classes to stay on the straight and narrow. They can give them a good feeling by giving them some aid and also by making clear that they are far better off. Projecting the poor as bogeymen can help parents and teachers with the schooling of children by suggesting that if they are lazy, they will also become poor.

4.8  The goals of feminism

Simmel argued that our culture has become distinctly male instead of human. This situation generates special conflicts that define the predicament of women. It determines the relations between men and women and makes it very difficult to rectify this course of events in a gender-neutral direction. His problem with existing forms of feminism was not if women could perform at the same level as men in the economy, politics, arts and science. Aspiring to achieve this form of equality would only reinforce an already existing masculine objective culture. For him, the crucial question was whether feminism could bring about qualitatively new entities that not only will reproduce for women what already exists for men, but also create objective cultural forms in which the authentic female character is expressed.

Simmel discerned three basic perspectives on gender relations: conservative, liberal and socialist. Conservatives expand the principle that men and women occupy distinct and mutually exclusive social domains to an ideology that legitimises the dominant position of men. The exclusion of women from economic and political life was based on a whole set of social, economic, psychological, anatomical and theological arguments. Conservative minds believed that the emancipation of women would compromise the authority of husbands and fathers and thus demolish the structure of the family. Higher education would turn women into argumentative and discontented wives. And women that entered the job market would neglect their home, husband, and children. Social changes like these were thought not to be in line with God’s intentions. Devout conservatives believed that God had created women to be the assistant of men. They feared that allowing women to have the same sort of jobs and social roles as men would rob the women from their femininity and damage their health.[74]

Conservative doctrine reserved all non-domestic economic production for men, and childcare and household affairs for women, though in the case of upper-middle class women servants performed all these typically female chores. Hundred years ago this economic division was closely related to the public/private dichotomy. In general, males were supposed to be engaged in productive activities outside the home. Men went to their jobs and boys went to school. Women and girls stayed at home. The purpose of female education (at home) was to develop domestic skills and good manners rather than vocational training. All this was related to another doctrine about the separation of the spheres of production and consumption. Thus, in the age of industrialization, most women were confined to the sphere of consumption. This separate-spheres model imposed an ethic of charity, chastity, and sacrifice upon women. The dominant view ascribed cool rationality, authority, and decisiveness to men and emotionality and submissiveness to women.

The exclusion of women from public life, based on the separate-spheres model, has lead to political reactions. Already in 1869, John Stuart Mill advocated a liberal model that stated that there should be perfect equality between the sexes.[75] Mill was convinced that the natural creative capacities of men and women are the same. So, there was no valid reason why women should not have the same rights and opportunities as men. Therefore, women deserve what men already have: the same rights and the same access to public life. Though, Mill granted women the right to also opt for a traditional marriage and family life.

The third model is the socialist model. It embraces the basic ideal of liberalism and its advocacy of equal rights and equal opportunities, but it denied women the right to the ownership of private property or private businesses. Of course, the early socialists were against all forms of private property and private businesses. Moreover, they opposed liberalism as an ideology that legitimated capitalism, with its inherent exploitation of men and women alike. In their view, men as well as women had to be liberated from capitalist oppression.[76] The socialists believed that the liberal form of emancipation would only lead to a partial solution of the problem. At best it would slightly improve but not eliminate the economic dependence of women. Therefore, the general aim of woman emancipation should be directed at the transformation of the capitalist order, to eradicate both wage slavery, which greatly affected working women and (marital) sex slavery, which, in their view, is intimately connected with property rights and industrial-capitalism. The draw back for socialist feminists was that they felt obliged to give higher priority to the greater goal of the class struggle, because, as dogma would have it, the unavoidable and successful class struggle would solve everything, including sex discrimination.

Simmel rejected all three models because they reduce femininity to one aspect. The conservatives subordinate femininity to motherhood, whereas the liberals and socialists take feminist ideals solely from the basic dreams of economic and political equality. For Simmel, being a woman is a specific form of life that is neither equal to masculinity, nor just motherhood. Quite another problem is that the negative effects of male domination obscure authentic femininity. The fundamental relativity in the life of our species lies in the relationship between masculinity and femininity. We assess the achievements and commitments, the intensity and structural forms of the nature of men and women by reference to certain norms. But, as we know, within almost all existing societies these norms are not gender-neutral. On the contrary, they themselves are of a male nature.[77]  The male acquires the status of the generally human, governing the phenomena of the individual male and female in the same way. In various media, this fact is grounded in the power position of men.

“… [W]omen – their accomplishments, convictions and the practical and theoretical contents of their lives – encounter the absolute standard (which is formed by the criteria that are valid for men). At the same time, this absolute standard is juxtaposed or opposed to a relative standard that is no less a consequence of the male prerogative and often imposes demands that are antithetical to it. This is because the man requires from the woman what is pleasing to him in his capacity as a self-interested party and in his polar relationship to her.”[78]

For the sake of the argument, Simmel quite grossly equated the relationship between the sexes as that between master and slave. He was convinced that the master does not always need to think about the fact that he is master. The position of the slave, on the other hand, ensures that he can never forget that he is a slave. Likewise, a woman can never forget that she is in an inferior position. The man as master does not take as vital an interest in his relationship to the female as the woman must do in her relationship to the male. As a result, the expressions of the male nature are easily transposed into the sphere of trans-specific, neutral objectivity and validity. Most judgments, institutions, aspirations and interests which men naively regard as simply objective and gender-neutral are thoroughly and characteristically male.[79]

From time immemorial, domination by oppression has made it its business to provide itself with an objective justification: in short, to transform might into right. The history of politics, priesthood, market domination, and family law are full of examples of this process. The fact that the masculine has become the objective and impartial standard of authority has fateful consequences for the valuation of women. They are viewed as angels or as devils, as loving and caring mothers or as sinful whores and seducers. On the one hand, we see a mystifying overestimation of women. On the other hand, all misunderstandings and underestimations are a consequence of judging women according to criteria that are created for an antithetical being. On this basis, the autonomy of the female principle cannot be acknowledged at all. As long as this is the case, the emancipation of women remains an unfinished business.

4.9  Conflicts, competition and domination

Marx and Simmel developed contrasting and complementary theories of social conflict. Marx was politically motivated to understand and eradicate capitalism. Simmel did not have such a great passion for social change, let alone revolution.[80] Both Marx and Simmel used the concept of ‘dialectics’. From a dialectical perspective, any given set of social relations contains its opposite. ‘Goodness’ only takes on meaning in reference to ‘badness’. And ‘order’ implicitly makes reference to ‘disorder’. In Simmel’s view, there probably exists no social unit in which the tendencies for order and disorder, for convergence and divergence, are not inseparably interwoven. An absolutely centripetal and harmonious group is unreal – it might as well be dead – whereas conflicts are sure signs of life.

4.9.1      The civilizing function of competition    

Some violent acts that are committed simply for the satisfaction of the desire to behave violently seem to exclude all forms of sociation. If, however, there is any consideration for the other party, if there is any restraint to violence, then there already exists a socializing factor. It is almost inevitable that an element of sharing and commonness injects itself into the mutual hatred or animosity once the stage of open violence yields to negotiations about the ending of the conflict. And even if the conflict ends in a clear victory of one group over the other, this will lead to some union of interests. Even slavery produces a sociological condition in which people have to co-operate. Hence, quite frequently, it produces its own mitigation. Thus, divergence and harmony become inextricably interconnected.[81]

Competition in commerce, politics and sports always involves many socially interconnected participants. Many kinds of interests, which eventually hold the group together, seem to come and stay alive by way of competitive struggles. Yet, usually analysts stress the poisonous, divisive and destructive effects of competition. Modern competition is described as the fight of all against all, but Simmel indicated that it often is a fight of all for all. It has immense socializing effects. Nobody will overlook the squandering of resources in the struggle against the competitor. The overkill of ads in the media is one case in point. But one should also acknowledge that competition creates an immense cohesive force. It is a wrestling for applause, admiration, devotion, support and other kinds of rewards. It is a wrestling of the few for the many, as well as a fight of the many for the few. In short, it is a web of a thousand sociological threads by means of conscious concentration on the will, feeling and thinking of fellow men. It is an intricate process of the adaptation of the producers to the consumers, of the multiplied possibilities of gaining favour and connection.

The socializing power of competition shows itself in the coarser, public cases, and also within families and love relationships. We find two parties competing for a third in numerous relationships. We find it in heated debates over ideological convictions and observe it when people engage in social small talk. Whenever it occurs, the antagonism of the competitors is paralleled by some offering, beguiling, coaxing, promising or imposing, which sets each of them in relation to the third party. For the victor in particular, this relation often attains an intensity, which it would not have without the excitement of the competition and continuous comparison of his own achievement with that of the other.[82]

Man’s most valuable object is man. The human being is the most condensed, most fruitfully exploitable phenomenon; and the necessity of winning him over grows in the measure in which his mechanical appropriation weakens. To achieve our goal, especially when we fight with someone else for a third party, be it a lover, a friend, a boss or a prospective client, this can be achieved in a thousand ways, through the means of persuasion or conviction, surpassing or underselling, through suggestion or threat, in short, through social-psychological connection. But just as often, this winning over also means the founding of a relationship – from the momentary relation established by a purchase in a shop to the more enduring relationship of a marriage. So, according to Simmel, as the intensity and complexity of social life increases, the struggle for the most condensed of all goods, the human being, must multiply and deepen interactions that bring individuals together.[83]

4.9.2             The social function of conflict

Conflicts are also of great significance for the inner structure of each party itself. Experience shows how a quarrel between two individuals changes each of them. It can distort, purify, weaken or strengthen them. The fighters must also ‘pull themselves together’. They have to concentrate all their energies in one point so that they can be used at any moment in any direction that might be required. The same forms of behaviour are required for groups that take part in a struggle. This need for centralization, for the pulling together of all elements, without loss of energy and time, is obvious. Such centralization supersedes even the most perfect forms of democratic decision-making. That’s why social organizations, nations, political parties and labour unions quickly change their structure of decision making as soon as the fight get serious. Wars need a centralist, hierarchical organization. For this reason, the organization of the army is the most centralized of all, with the exception perhaps of the fire brigade. The army is the organization in which the unconditional rule of the central authority excludes any dependent movement of the parts. Every order from head quarters must be translated into the movement of the whole without any dynamic loss.[84] If this rule is not obeyed the loss can be terrible.

In his epic book August 1914, Solzhenitsyn writes how two big Russian armies were slaughtered near the Masurian lakes in East Prussia. The first army was lead by an old general, who only wished to die of old age in his bed at home and not as a hero on the battlefield. Therefore, he interpreted the orders in the most passive form. Instead of urging his troops forward, he let them move on rather slowly or not at all, while he reported to head quarters that his reconnaissance patrols and advance guards were moving quickly ahead. The other army was lead by a young colonel, eager to advance his career. In contrast, he followed the orders in the most active way and even urged his troops to march forward much quicker than was expected. As a result the two armies were split apart. This weakened their combined strength dramatically. As soon as the general commander of the German army noticed this, he started a ferocious flank attack. The separated armies were defeated quite easily and tens of thousands of Russian soldiers got killed.

4.9.3             Two sides of authority and domination

Simmel has new light on authority and domination. Whatever the degree of inequality or domination, there is always some space for a counter influence by the subordinate party. Even in situations of total repression or subjugation, there is some room for mutual interactions. So, even in these cases Simmel speaks of sociation. The powerful need this mutual relationship. The dominated person has to respond to the wishes and demands of his master. Otherwise this relationship will lose its function. Generally, the power is exerted for a reason. The authoritative person wants to continue this relation in order to make more use of it. If the dominated one refuses to play along, then all is lost. On the other hand, dominated persons must have something to gain from it too. When they truly believe that ending this misbalanced relationship will bring them more harm than continuing it, then they will not stop it. If we condone the suppression by a tyrant, this is because we fear more negative repercussions of a revolt. Even a tyrant is restricted in his freedom by legal rules and procedures. He cannot sentence people to death or confiscate their possessions at random. In theory and in practice, an absolute monarch can change and remake laws as he likes, but in general he does not do this, because such dictatorial actions tend to diminish his authority. Even dictators want respect of other political leaders.

As long as the subordinated accept their position, we can observe a real social relation, a real process of sociation. However, as soon as a leader abuses his subordinated people as means for his own ends, treats them as objects, we can no longer speak of a social relation. For Simmel, following Kant, the basic principle of ethics is that one should never use another human purely as a mere object, though, to a certain degree, all parties use each other. For example, we tend to accept the authority of our boss or chief, because not only he or she has more experience, but also because he or she has the power to influence our income and career. It is possible to restore the balance by making yourself very useful. Then the chief will need you just as much as you need the approval and support of the chief.

We should never look at inequality from one perspective. There is more to it than domination and repression. There are many forms aspects, and degrees of inequality. Sometimes the roles are reversed. Then, followers become leaders and vice versa. Leaders of big democratic parties have to listen carefully to their followers; otherwise they run the risk of losing them. Duke Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, former Bishop and Minister of Foreign Affairs for Napoleon Bonaparte, once said: “Look there goes my people. I must follow them, for I am their leader.” In other words, good democratic leaders have to follow their followers, acknowledge their main priorities. Otherwise, they will not last long as leader. So, as long as the leader thinks it worthwhile to stay in command and to enjoy the privileges that go with the job, he will lend his ear to his followers, for he depends on the support of his followers.

4.9.4             Forms of leadership and group cohesion

Simmel distinguished three forms of domination: domination by a person, a group or a principle. In his analysis, he combined this formal characteristic with other formal aspects, such as the measure and type of consensus or disagreement within groups or the degree of hierarchy. It matters whether the chief or leader is an insider or an outsider. It also matters whether there is more than one leader. Clearly, when there are more leaders the subordinated possess more opportunities to realize more freedom. Think of children who play off their parents against each other because they have learned that they disagree on some aspects of pedagogy. On the other hand, when both parents act as a unit, they will have more authority over their children.

The submission of a group to one person often leads to increased coherence of the group. This is true for the unity of the group against its leader or for the unity between the group and the leader. For example, if the leader of a political party follows the prevailing ideas of the group but tends to shape them more clearly, this will enhance social cohesion. The creation of a clear distance between group members and the leader can also enhance unity. In this case all members want to get near the leader, but simultaneously keep a watchful eye at each other to maintain the same respectful distance. Of course, differences in social distance to the leader will arise. And thus a hierarchy will develop that can produce greater stability.

The degree of resistance against the leader is also of great importance. Opposition tends to unite the revolutionary group. It is generally believed that a common enemy unites individuals. This is even more so when the common enemy is the leader of the group. Human beings are double dealers in cases of submission. Many people like to be lead and to have someone who decides for them. Also many people need somebody or organization that sets limits, that steers their actions and is prepared to act sternly whenever this is asked for. They need an organization or an authority that protects them against dangers from outside, but also from dangers from within, against their own unrestrained instincts. Other people hate the authorities, almost automatically resist their leaders and protest against any show of social control. But it is precisely because of this counter pressure that the leader gets more power and becomes more meaningful as a social actor. This situation also helps to mark borderlines more clearly. Simmel did not shun psychological assumptions. To him, humans are endowed with both drives. They need both motives to discover and fix their own identity as a leader or a subject.

“Occasionally the consciousness of being under coercion, of being subject to a super-ordinate authority, is revolting or oppressive – whether the authority is an ideal or a social law, an arbitrarily-decreeing personality or the executor of higher norms. But for the majority of men, coercion is probably an irreplaceable support and cohesion of the inner and outer life.”[85]

4.10 Philosophy and sociology of money

Simmel tended to view society from below, from the perspective of a frog. Doing so, he brilliantly captured the spirit of the times in The Philosophy of Money. His friend and colleague Karl Joël said that this book was bound to a single place and a single period, but yet, projected the soul of modern Berlin onto a universal level.[86] It certainly is a landmark in the field of cultural sociology. Therefore, the title is misleading. Though it definitely it contains many philosophical analyses, the book could just as well have been titled Sociology of Money, for it deals extensively with the social implications of economic behaviour. Simmel showed that the transition from a traditional system of barter towards a money economy had many important consequences, which reached much further than mere economic actions. He characterized modernity as one dominated by money that dumbfounds everything into mere nuances of its own impure colour. To a significant degree we are dominated by money. There is no doubt about it. Money tends to determine everything. Therefore, special attention is given to the question of what are the essential characteristics of money, why did it change economic proceedings so dramatically that it also changed social life completely, including the culture of societies and the mindsets of individuals. 

4.10.1     What is money?

The system of pure barter could only blossom in times of scarcity. The introduction of money changed everything. Money can be divided in small units of the same value. This makes it very practical. Also money is impersonal. It is very different from real objects to which we might have become attached because we have worked very hard to construct them or have inherited them from one of loved ones. Hence, it is a means that can be used very easily for economic transactions. Money enhances calculation. It is the incarnation of the spirit of rationalism. In a money-economy social relations tend to become more impersonal. Besides, it speeds up all kinds of business transactions. This enhances personal freedom. Imagine that money was not invented yet and you would like to purchase a bed from someone. But he wants a good horse in return and you do not possess a horse. To achieve your goal, you would have to exchange something with somebody else who has a good horse. It is very likely that you need other swappings to acquire the bed. It would involve many social interactions with people with whom you are familiar, whom you trust and who might expect help from you whenever they get involved in a similar complex transaction that involves a similar chain of exchanges to fix the deal. So, it is easy to see why a money economy is more efficient, more abstract, less personal and creates more freedom.

Money substitutes durable connections of ‘natural’ social groups by voluntary (temporal) relations. It also has an egalitarian effect. It puts different things and services at the same level of a financial scale. People with very different professions might earn the same salary. Clearly the introduction of money had significant repercussions for social relations. People became less dependent on their families. After the invention of money people could take economic decisions much more easily. When social relations are being mediated by the sale and purchase of goods in exchange for money, then no longer we are personally dependent on other people. All relations become impersonal and social fragmentation grows rampant. Persons become replaceable. No longer are we interested in the typical personal qualities of a dentist or a plumber. Personal qualities become relative. Does the worth of a baker depend on the quality of his bread, on the prices he asks for his products, on his communicative skills and his personal interest for his customers?

For Simmel, only transactions for money have that character of a fleeting relationship that leaves no traces. In particular this is the case with prostitution. By giving money the whore-hopper completely distances him from the relationship. They have settled matters more completely than by presenting a gift, which, by its contents, its selection and its use, maintains a wisp of the personality of the giver. Hence, only money is an appropriate equivalent to the momentary satisfaction of the desire served by prostitutes. Money is never an adequate means in a relationship between persons that hinges on duration and integrity – like love, even when it is only for a short time. But money serves the purpose of getting sexual pleasure most matter-of-factly and completely. In prostitution, the relation is reduced to its generic content. It is limited to the natural act. Individual differences are of no importance. Therefore, the perfect economic counterpart of this relation is money, for it, too, is beyond all individual differences. It can represent any object or service. The indifference with which it lends itself to any use, the infidelity with which it leaves everyone, its lack of ties to anyone, and its complete objectification that excludes any attachment and makes it suitable as a pure means – all this suggests a striking resemblance between the nature of money and the nature of prostitution. The debasement of prostitution lies in the fact that the most personal possession of a woman is considered equivalent to the most neutral value of all, one that is most remote from anything that is personal.[87]

4.10.2     Values and valuations

Simmel started his study of money with an analysis about value. The physical world does not know good or bad. Only humans categorize things into good or bad. The lion that kills his prey is no better or worse than the cow that eats grass. Valuation is a strictly human thing. For us, something gets value as soon as we need or desire it. People have many needs and desires. They busy themselves with valuating objects, events and relations. But this valuation is subjective. Not everyone likes the sun and high temperatures; some prefer a cloudy sky and cool weather. When farmers pray for rain after a long period of drought, others hope that it will stay dry during their holidays.

Economic transactions create a field of values that is completely disconnected from the subjective personal values. It does not matter at all what the ‘real’ value is of an object. The only thing that matters is the price that has to be paid at the market, that dynamic institution that has emerged out of countless individual transactions of exchange. Market prices are the outcome of the law of supply and demand. The decision to buy or to sell is a process of weighing many arguments in which all kinds of subjective and social values play a major role. For Simmel these economic exchanges are no different from any other transaction of exchange. In fact, each interaction with a fellow human being is a form of exchange. It involves the investment of time. It entails skills to interact with other people and to gather and exchange information about the social value of various objects and services. It encompasses much more than the cost of labour or the costs of production. Simmel disagrees with Marx. For him, in a way, money is the most pure incarnation of all that exists. Things get their meaning from their relation to other things. The value of goods does not depend on their inherent quality, or the cost of its production, but on the relations between things, on the relative position of things. The value of a good or a service on a particular day depends on the mix of priorities, preferences and solvability of all buyers and sellers.

To Simmel money symbolizes the essential structure of our reality. Money constitutes the clearest image and the best incorporation of our existence. Prices signify how the value of things and services are related to each other. The value is not fixed in the ‘essential’ quality of an object, but in our evaluation of that quality. If our evaluations change prices will change too. The market is the economic-historical realization of the relativity of the value of goods. 

4.10.3     Modernity and money

To Simmel, the hallmark of modernity was the continuing transience of everything. Nothing remains. Everything changes; blossoms wither away and are substituted by something else: fashions and fads in cars, clothing, interior design and popular music, whatever. Art and architecture seem to demand a continuous process of revaluation, innovation and creative destruction. And the most transient of all is money. Its value changes everyday. Inflation rates can oscillate and the same is true for interest rates. Share prices go down or up when economic or political crises emerge or end. Companies can get into financial trouble as a consequence of their own doing or because they are entangled with other companies that have got into great debt. And when big businesses get into trouble, many small businesses will feel the pain too. All this might change for the better after these companies have solved their problems and have started to grow and make profit again.

Simmel already envisioned money as pure action, pure movement, long before the Internet was invented and cash could flow all over the world in a matter of seconds. Money that lays idle, sits in a piggy bank, lies in a pot under the floor, and largely loses its function. It does not even gain interest. One should put the money in a savings account and collect some interest or invest it in attractive financial transactions to make money with money. But virtual profits have to be cashed in on time; otherwise they can vanish into thin air.   

4.10.4     A modern view on the modernity of the past

Reading some of Simmel’s insightful descriptions of one century ago gives us the feeling that he is describing modernizing trends of our own day and age. Therefore, his work still is highly relevant. In his renewed essay on the famous French sculptor Rodin he said that searching for psychological explanations is the essence of modernity. Never before, so much emphasis was being put on experiencing and interpreting the world in terms of inner feelings.[88] As an observant watcher of social trends, Simmel focused on a whole array of emotions: love, greed, trust and distrust, gratitude, boredom, getting cynic, feeling blasé or alienated. Especially boredom and feeling blasé are consequences of modernity. In particular many inhabitants of big cities are feeling blasé. They have seen it all and experienced everything. They have witnessed all kinds of awesome events and spectacular festivities. And each time, it was more awesome and more spectacular than before. After a while, the spectacular did become normal. Boredom is also connected to modern jobs. Each day large groups of people have to do the same productive activities in a rhythm of its own, a rhythm that is not connected with the course of the day or the change of the seasons. The implication of this description is that modernity weakens our contact with the external world. The modern experience is transformed from a concrete and conscious historical experience to a fluent, ephemeral, individual inner experience.[89] Modernity turns all our earlier experiences of time, location and causality upside down and changes them into temporality, stopovers and contingency. Thus modernity strongly differs from Antiquity and the Middle Ages. In the past change came so slowly. It hardly got noticed. Most methods production remained cumbersome and hardly changed through many centuries. Yet there was little room for boredom, for the struggle for life, just above or below the subsistence level, demanded everyone’s alertness, 24/7. 

4.11 Conclusions

During his entire academic career Simmel moved from one topic to the next. Ortega y Gasset compared him to a squirrel, jumping from tree to tree, always on the lookout for fresh and shiny nuts, scarcely bothering to nibble much at any of them. His originality, his sparkling intellect and his ability to move with great ease from one topic to another affronted most of his colleagues and superiors. They felt that only sustained commitment to one or at most a very small number of specific problems suited academic work. In their view worthwhile scholarship required deep digging, instead of just quickly scanning unexplored fields. But in Simmel’s case versatility did not imply a lack of depth or originality. On the contrary, his contribution to philosophy, history, ethics and the social sciences shows otherwise. His work in sociology consists of a close scrutiny of many facets of social life.[90] His approach can best be understood as a self-conscious rejection of the organic realism of Comte and the ideographic method of German humanities. Comte’s organic approach stressed the fundamental continuity between nature and society. From this perspective it was entirely natural to apply the methods of natural science to social science. In contrast, idealistic philosophers vigorously opposed this idea. In their view, the humanities differed qualitatively from physics; natural laws had no place in the study of social phenomena. They argued that sociology had no real, tangible object of study. There is no society outside or in addition to the individuals who compose it. About a century later, Mrs Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, echoed this view when she argued that there is no such thing as society: “There only are individuals. There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first.”[91]

Simmel rejected both schools of thought. For him society is an intricate web of multiple relations established among constantly interacting individuals. The major field of study is association and the supra-individual structures – the state, the family, the city, the political party and the business organization – that are the crystallizations of these patterned interactions.

Though Simmel considered these larger structures a legitimate field of sociological inquiry, he preferred to restrict most of his work to investigations of what he called ‘interactions among the atoms of society’. He focused on the relatively durable and, in his view, limited number of forms that such interactions might take.[92] In his perspective a host of otherwise distinct social phenomena might be properly understood by reference to the same formal concept. For instance you can not only find various sectarian forms within religious movements, but also in revolutionary cells and in small groups of artists that are devoted to one style of work only.

In his last book he celebrated the ultimate victory of life over form, of movement over stasis. Living under the shadow of death he conceived of life as “an irreversible current in which each moment dissolves into the next.”[93] This last attempt to develop a comprehensive vitalistic orientation did not serve to unify his work. He did not lay the foundation for a Simmel school of sociologists, but many sociologists have made ample use of his seminal ideas. The modern critique of mass culture and mass society owes a huge, though often unacknowledged debt, to Simmel. Moreover, he has added noticeable contributions to Marx and Durkheim’s discussions on alienation and anomie. As Raymond Aron and others have pointed out, the author of The Stranger is among the foremost commentators of the isolation, uprootedness, pliability and flexibility of modern men. His work gave a major impulse to the urban sociologists of The Chicago School. He paved the way to many studies into the personalities and lifestyles of modern city dwellers and the social distance that can emerge between different categories of people. Simmel’s mark on macro sociology is more difficult to trace, though it definitely exists. For instance Lewis Coser’s The Functions of Social Conflict incorporated Simmel’s insights into the subject.[94] His systematic use of the concept of social role quickly spilled over into daily life and our collective conscience.

David Frisby has reintroduced Simmel by giving him the clothes of a post-modernist avant le lettre. The incorporation of Simmel’s essayistic and impressive oeuvre on lifestyles, fashion, taste, city life and art sits well in the eclectic approach of postmodernism. However, Simmel’s attempt to find formal concepts that could transcend the supposedly ephemeral character of any modern era does not square with the post-modern rejection of grand narratives and general theories. Perhaps it is better to skip this brand of critique and agree that Georg Simmel has enriched sociology with many sharp insights, intriguing concepts and inspiring ideas.

[1] Simmel dedicated his Ph.D. thesis ‘with gratitude and love to “his fatherly friend Julius Friedländer”’. See Michael Landmann. Bausteine zur Biographie. In: Buch des Dankens an Georg Simmel. Briefe, Erinnerungen, Bibliographie. Ed. by Kurt Gassen & Michael Landmann. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1958. pp. 11-34.

[2] Georg Simmel: Das Wesen der Materie nach Kants physischer Monadologie

[3] This is a kind of second Ph.D. thesis that serves as entry exam for full professorships

[4] K. Gassen & M. Landmann (Eds.) (1958): Buch des Denkens an Georg Simmel (p. 21). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot

[5] According to Simmel’s student Siegfried Kracauer, quoted by David Frisby, o. c., p. 133

[6] P.E. Schnabel (1976). Georg Simmel. In D. Kaesler: Klassiker des soziologischen Denkens (p. 272). Volume I. Münich: Beck

[7] G. Simmel (1890). Über soziale Differenzierung. Soziologische und psychologische Untersuchung (p. 48). Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot

[8] M. Weber: Roscher und Knies. Logische Problemen der historische Ökonomie

[9] Georg Simmel: Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die formen der Vergesellschaftung. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1908

[10] L.A. Coser (1971): Master of Sociological Thought. New York: Harcourt Brace Yanovich, p. 209

[11] G. Simmel (1918): Lebensanschauung. Vier Metaphysische Kapitel (Perspective on life: Four metaphysical chapters). Berlin: Duncker und Humblot

[12] Idem

[13] In his epistemology Simmel follows the following three staged scheme:

• The differentiation of subject and object in the individual mind;
• The differentiation of cognitive objects by means of a categorical evaluation;
• The heuristic unification of cognitive objects within a pragmatic relativism. (See: Wallisch-Prinz: Sociology of Freedom. Georg Simmel’s Theory of Modern Society. Dissertation. University of Bremen, 1977. p 84-85.)

[14] B. Wallisch-Prinz quotes Simmel from the German edition of The Philosophy of Money

[15] B. Wallisch-Prinz: o. c. pp 86-87

[16] Philosophy of Money, o. c. pp 6-7

[17] Idem: pp 88-90

[18] Philosophy of Money, o. c., pp 6-7

[19] Soziologie, o. c. p 45

[20] Soziologie; o. c.  pp 41-42

[21] G. Simmel (1980): On the Nature of Historical Understanding. In Guy Oakes: Essays on Interpretation on Social Science (p. 97).

[22] Idem: pp 101-102

[23] G. Simmel (1964): The Field of Sociology. In Kurt H. Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel. Translated and with an introduction by Kurt H. Wolff (pp. 3-25). London: The Free Press.

[24] L. A. Coser: o .c.: p. 211

[25]  Sociology of Georg Simmel, o. c. pp 5-7

[26] All this does not invalidate that the natural sciences and other sciences, have shown that a thorough investigation of small elements can lead to valuable insights

[27] D.N. Levine (1965): Some key problems in Simmel’s work. In: Makers of modern social science. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall (pp.97-98).

[28] Moreover: “The ego can become more clearly conscious of this unity the more he is confronted with the task of reconciling within himself a diversity of group interests.”

[29] Simmel, o. c.: pp 198-204

[30] Idem, p. 203

[31] Idem, p 11

[32] G. Simmel (1970) (original 1917): Grundfragen der Soziologie (Individuum und Gesellschaft). Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co

[33] L. von Wiese (1965): Simmel’s formal method. In George Simmel & Lewis A. Coser (Eds.): Makers of modern social science (pp. 53-55). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall

[34] Simmel uses this organic analogy to emphasize that without the interspersed effects of countless minor social syntheses, society would break down into a multitude of discontinuous systems.

[35] Idem, p. 10

[36] K. Popper (1963): Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Karl R. Popper (1972): Objective Knowledge; an Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[37] Simmel quoted by Kurt Wolff in The Sociology of Georg Simmel (1950). New York: The Free Press.

[38] G. Simmel (1978): The Philosophy of Money (p. 55). London: Routledge. (See Frisby)

[39] G. Simmel (1896): Soziologische Ästhetik (p. 206). (Quoted by D. Frisby, o. c. )

[40] B. Wallisch-Prinz: o. c. pp 89-90

[41] G. Simmel (1968: The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other Essays. New York: Teachers College Press. (Der Konflikt der modernen Kultur. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1918.)

[42] G. Simmel (1980): Essays on Interpretation in Social Science (pp. 9-10). (Translated and edited with an introduction by Guy Oakes). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

[43] G. Simmel (1967): Fragmente und Aufsätze. Munich: Drei Marken Verlag (p. 204).

[44] G. Simmel (1980): On the history of Philosophy. In: Georg Simmel Essays on Interpretation in Social Science (p. 202).

[45] A.M. Bevers (1982): Geometrie van de samenleving. Filosofie en sociologie in het werk van Georg Simmel (p. 199). Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus.

[46] G. Simmel (1971): In: D. Levine: Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms (p. 187). Chicago: Chicago University Press.

[47] Bevers mentions four locations in: Soziologie.  p. 87

[48] Bevers, o. c. p 91

[49] Idem, pp 154-155

[50] G. Simmel (1971): The stranger. In Donald N. Levine (Ed.): Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms (pp. 143-149). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

[51] G. Simmel (1971): The Adventurer. In Donald N. Levine (Ed.): Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms (pp. 187-198). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. (Das Abenteuer. In: Philosophische Kultur: Gesammelte Essays. Leipzig: W. Klinkhardt, 1911)

[52] Idem

[53] G. Simmel (1964): In: Donald N. Levine: On Individuality and Social Forms (pp. 251-252).

[54] Idem, p. 253

[55] N. Elias later developed this idea by pointing to a growing shift in what he calls the We-I-balance into the direction of greater individualism in globalizing networks

[56] Idem, p 259

[57] Idem, pp 263-265

[58] G. Oakes; pp 38-42

[59] G. Simmel (1976): The conflict of Modern Culture. In P.A. Lawrence, George Simmel: sociologist and European (p.223). Sunbury-on-Thames, Middlesex: Nelson.

[60] Idem, p. 224

[61] G. Simmel (1904): Philosophie des Geldes. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot

[62] G. Simmel (1911). Der Begriff und die Tragödie der Kultur. In: Philosophische Kultur ( pp. 245-277).

[62] G. Oakes, o. c., pp. 12-13.

[63] Idem

[64] G. Oakes, o. c., p 4

[65] G. Simmel: Brücke und Tür. Stuttgart. K. F. Koehler: 1957, p. 94 (Quoted by Oakes)

[66] A.J. Dunning (1992): Extremes: Reflections on Human Behavior (pp. 69-84). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

[67] G. Simmel (1971): The Poor. In: Donald N. Levine (Ed.), Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms (pp. 150-178). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

[68]  M.B. Katz (1989): The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare. New York: Pantheon books.

[69] V.S. Naipaul (1964): An Area of Darkness. Hammondsworth: Penguin Books.

[70] H.A.R. Gibb (1975): Islam: a historical survey. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[71] This aspect if further elaborated in Abram de Swaan (1988). In Care of the State: Health care, education and welfare in Europe and the USA in the Modern Era. Cambridge: Polity Press/Oxford University Press.

[72] G. Simmel (1971): The Poor. In: Donald N. Levine (Ed.), George Simmel: On Individuality and social Forms (p. 155). Chicago: The University of Chicago.

[73] Idem

[74] J.N. Burstyn (1980): Victorian Education and the Ideal of Womanhood. Ottawa: Barnes and Noble Books.

[75]  J.S. Mill (1869): On the Subjection of Women. In: Collected Works of John Stuart Mills (1983), Volume 21. Toronto: University of Toronto Press

[76] A. Bebel (1971, orig.1883): Woman under Socialism. New York: Schocken.

[77] G. Simmel (1984): The problem of the sexes. In Georg Simmel: On Women, Sexuality and Love. New Haven: Yale University Press. (p. 102).

[78] Idem, p 105

[79] Idem: pp103-104

[80] J.H. Turner (1978): The Structure of Sociological Theory (pp.122-123). Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press

[81] G. Simmel (1955): Conflict. Glencoe: The Free Press.

[82] Idem

[83] Idem

[84] Idem

[85] The Sociology of George Simmel, op. cit., 299 f. Translated by Kurt H. Wolff, 1950.

[86] K. Joël quoted by David Frisby, o. c., p. 132.

[87] G. Simmel (1971): Prostitution. In Donald N. Levine (Ed.): Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

[88]  G. Simmel (1923). Philosophische Kultur (p. 196).

[89] This definition of modernity closely resembles the definition of post-modernity that emerged almost one century later. Images and appearances seem to become more important reality. Emotions recover from the blows of super rationality and the objective world of science is replaced, at least partly, by hyper nervous subjective world.

[90] L. A. Coser (1956): The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe. p. 4

[91] Thatcher, Margaret. 1987. ‘Interview for “Woman’s Own” (“No Such Thing as Society”).’

[92] Idem: pp 5-6

[93] G. Simmel (1923): Fragmente und Aufsätze (p. 185). Munich: Drei Marken Verlag. (Quoted by Lewis Coser

[94] L. A. Coser (1956): The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe