Jürgen Habermas

11. Jürgen Habermas: a critical sociology for emancipation[1]

 11.1  Short introduction, biography and academic career

The awesome productivity of Jürgen Habermas has drawn the attention of many social scientists, philosophers and intellectuals. At the beginning of his academic career he was seen as the principal inheritor of the Frankfurt School, a renowned group of philosophers, psychologists and sociologists with a strong affinity with the ideas of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. The Frankfurt School was highly critical of modern society. Later, Habermas would question many of its theories. But, as he said, one can only remain in such a tradition by criticizing and transforming it. The only traditions that survive are those that change in order to accommodate new situations.[2] Though he has changed some of his views, he has never abandoned the basic objectives of critical theory; its strong concern with social equality and emancipation. The lineage of Habermas’ ideas is difficult to trace. Each new instalment of his oeuvre incorporates insights from a continuously expanding range of scholars. He has drawn widely from empirical studies of economic, political, and cultural conditions and, later in life he showed a strong interest in theological topics.  The scope of his knowledge shows his great skill in synthesizing such a huge variety of ideas into new theoretical frameworks, like Auguste Comte and Talcott Parsons did before him.[3]

Jürgen Habermas was born in Düsseldorf, on 18 June 1929. He died on 14 March 2026, aged 96.  Jürgen Habermas grew up in Gummersbach, a little village not far from Düsseldorf. Four years later, Nazi-leader Adolph Hitler seized power, though for several years daily life in small towns like Gummersbach went on as if nothing had changed. His parents showed little support for the ideas of the Nazi’s. However, as president of the local chamber of commerce, his father did become a fellow traveller of sorts; otherwise he wouldn’t have kept his job.  Jürgen became a member of the Hitler Youth, as was expected of every German teenager in those dark days. It was only after the war, when the war criminals were brought to justice that he became fully aware of the great atrocities of the Second World War.[4] Post-war democratization and exceptional economic growth restored his trust in mankind. These two experiences – a strongly negative and a strongly positive one – would always be reflected in his perspective on human nature and society. He remains convinced that societies create violence as well as peaceful consensus.[5] In his view, the explanation of both the terror of the Nazi-regime and the miraculous economic and political recovery is to be found in the characteristics of German history and culture. Habermas had a great affinity with a type of explanation that leans on the same internal, causal factors for different kinds of social developments. This is manifested in his indestructible belief in the great ideals of the Enlightenment:

“Only Reason is capable of healing its self-inflicted wounds; only through a radicalization of its own ideals will the Enlightenment be capable of facing its own dangers.”[6]

Jürgen Habermas studied Philosophy in Göttingen, Bonn, and Zurich. In 1954, he finished his PhD thesis on the work of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. After that, he became a journalist and developed a strong interest in social issues and sociology. In 1955, he married Ute Wesselhoeft. They had three children: Tilmann (1956), Rebekka (1959) and Judith (1967). In 1956, Theodor W. Adorno, just returned from exile in the USA, invited Habermas to work at the Institut für Sozialforschung, better known as Die Frankfurter Schule. In the twenties, this institute was established by a small group of scholars who were influenced by the ideas of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. They had serious misgivings about modern society and wanted to construct a form of critical social theory that aimed at producing enlightenment and emancipation. In their view, capitalism repressed people and prevented them to from awareness of their true situation and interests. In order to be liberated, the individual should rid himself of ideological illusions and false consciousness.[7] Clearly, there was no room for such a critical institute when the Nazi’s had seized power. All its illustrious members quickly went abroad to escape imprisonment or worse. This was all the more necessary since most of them came from assimilated Jewish families. Ironically, the majority took refuge in the United States, the very center of capitalism.

After the war, back in Frankfurt, Max Horkheimer started a metamorphosis of the institute. In the wake of the cold war, he kept a low profile. Many pre-war publications were stashed away in cellars or re-issued in adapted versions. To put possible opponents on a wrong footing, the institute also accepted research grants from employer organizations. This did not lead to the complete erosion of critical theory, but it cut off new members from the intellectual past of the institute. Habermas, more than a generation younger then its founders, was the institute’s first non-Jewish member and also the first famous member who had actually grown up in Germany during the Nazi period. For all these reasons it was not possible for him to fully identify with the first wave of Critical Theory.[8] The main result of his co-operation with Theodor Adorno was his study The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,[9] an analysis of the large difference between the real situation and the ideal-typical, classic liberal model of public discourse. His famous concept of a Herrschaftsfreie Dialog was launched here. It presented a vision of a free speech community, where everyone can participate in the public debate without any danger of coercion. All forms of domination and coercion should be excluded from the public sphere, except “the coercionless coercion of the better argument”. Horkheimer refused to accept this Habilitationsschrift, because of its very critical content. Habermas resigned. Fortunately, Wolfgang Abendroth, professor of political sciences at Marburg, accepted this study.

Habermas taught philosophy at Heidelberg from 1961 till 1964. After that, he was appointed as professor of sociology and philosophy at Frankfurt and became the successor of Max Horkheimer, the very man who had rejected his Habilitation thesis. After a conflict with the left-wing student movement Habermas left Frankfurt for the second time, to become managing director of the Max Planck Institute. This institute did research on the human condition in the modern technological world. In 1983, Habermas returned to the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt to become professor of philosophy, with a focus on Social and Historical Philosophy. He kept this position until his retirement in 1994. During his career he was awarded many prizes and honorary doctorates. The praise for his work did not stop after his retirement. In 2001 he was awarded the Peace prize of the German Publishing Houses, and in 2004 he was awarded with the Kyoto-Prize for Art and Philosophy.

11.2  Sources of inspiration

Habermas’ Ph.D.-thesis discussed the work of Friedrich Schelling, who had tried to match the Gnostic tradition with standard approaches to philosophy. Gnosticism sketches black and white image of social life, which is dominated by evil forces; hate obscures love, and darkness reigns over light. Habermas is convinced that evil prevails in modern society. We live in the ‘wrong’ world. In the past something has gone terribly wrong. That is why we are now in a world dominated by the negative principle.[10]

European theologians and philosophers have tried to excommunicate the Gnostic orientation, for its esoteric treatises, ritual prescriptions, myths, and gospels stemming from ancient Egyptian, Persian and Judaic cults and traditions. It had blossomed on the fault line between Oriental and Western culture, and was diametrically opposed to the main ideas of Classical Greek philosophy. The Greek saw the universe as perfectly ordered, as a divine creature endowed with a psyche and reason. At clear nights they loved to look and the sky, adoring the stars, their purity and immortality, and the regularity and harmony of their movements. They were convinced that human beings were capable of understanding the cosmic order and could use this knowledge to guide their moral life. Thus they bridged the gap between theory and ethos, taking the regularity and supposed harmony of the stellar order as the supreme model for the social order. In stark contrast, the Gnostics envisioned the cosmos as a monstrosity of demonic powers. To them, it was a tyrannical order, a harsh and inescapable prison, a devilish labyrinth where all people would get lost.

Yet, the Gnostics believed that people had a divine origin and were endowed with a divine particle that was imprisoned in a body beset by low instincts and desires that lured people away from the knowledge of their godly origin and ultimate destiny. Gnostics believed that men had been thrown into the darkness of the world and were separated from the Primal Light.[11] Heidegger too sees human beings as ‘thrown’ into the world. As a consequence they have arrived in a state of intoxication and oblivion from which they can only be awakened by a ‘call from outside’, a calling from the Primal Light, that sometimes breaks through the thick veil of darkness. There are many parallels with Gnostic ideas in Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (Being and Time). Humans continuously flee their authentic inner essence, driven by fear. As these fears get stronger, they will no longer see the world as normal, natural, and trustworthy. Angst teaches them that they are worthless, empty, futile, and mortal creatures, incessantly in need of help from other beings. Men’s greatest fear is the angst for death, a death that is inevitable, because our time on earth is restricted. In Heidegger’s view, the voice of conscience acts as the divine. Although it is an internal voice, it appears to call us from outside. Moreover, individuals cannot control this voice that opposes their will. But, if they listen to their conscience, then people can withstand the seductions of life and discover their authentic essence.[12]

In his Ph.D. thesis Habermas discusses Heidegger’s conceptual distinction between the verfügende (commanding) and the vernehmende (serving) disposition. In the course of history the commanding disposition has become stronger and stronger, until it started to govern the pastoral disposition towards nature. Nowadays, many people want to control nature with scientific and technical means. They have forgotten to honour nature and don’t take care of it, as good stewards are supposed to do. This technical rationality has raged to such an extent that new forms of pauperism have emerged. Habermas saw it as his main task to expose and denounce this fateful chain of events. He hoped to contribute to the revival of a world, where mankind can live in freedom and harmony, and develop its capacities without any constraints.

11.2.1       The influence of Marx and the Frankfurt School

Positivist science, technology, and modern capitalism, was always critically regarded by Habermas, a reason why he has been branded as a Marxist. Undoubtedly, his work shows many signs of Marxist influences, but a series of historical events have gradually affected his views on Marxism.[13] Firstly, as the state now plays a major role in the economy, it is meaningless to consider the economy as the sole determinant of all governmental actions. State intervention has many forms, such as the taxation on the import or export of certain goods, or the exemption from taxation with other goods. Besides, the state subsidizes business companies or factories in many ways. Moreover, the government has set up a complex legal system in order to regulate labour conditions, production, transport, trade, and the consumption of goods, so as to protect workers, consumers, and the general public. That is why sociologists should investigate all state actions, as this important area of research cannot be left to the specialists of public administration. The issue of the legitimacy of laws and regulations has become a major theme in Habermas’ work. Secondly, the sharply increased standard of living has transformed the forms of economic repression. This requires a thorough reconsideration of the social and cultural conditions of the working classes. Presently, according to Habermas, the oppression of the working classes is manifested in psychological and moral control, rather than in terms of economic exploitation. Hence, there is a need to identify an alternative mechanism that will fulfil a quasi-revolutionary change. Thirdly, he had witnessed the disastrous application of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. The reality of applied socialism had shattered his confidence in communist solutions. These states had established a hugely bureaucratic apparatus so as to orchestrate the economy and bring about a fundamental change in the structure of society, but this did not generate the ideal of a classless society where emancipated people could develop all their capacities in freedom. Instead, these extremely powerful bureaucracies formed a new and effective system of oppression. Still, this deception did not turn him into a supporter of capitalism.[14]

The original program of the Frankfurt School was based on an attempt to expand on the theories of Marx, and later also on those of Freud, while remaining loyal to the basic goals of the Enlightenment. The philosophers of the Enlightenment were united by an ambitious agenda concerning secularism, humanism, cosmopolitanism, and liberalism. It claimed freedom in many forms – freedom from arbitrary power, freedom of speech, freedom of trade, freedom to realize one’s talents: in a word, freedom to make your own way in the world.[15] The underlying thought was to become emancipated on the basis of rational thought. Immanuel Kant proposed the claim of man to be recognized as a mature, responsible being, reason providing the means for growth and emancipation. Man would emerge from a self-imposed tutelage. He offered the motto of Sapere aude (Dare to know): to take the risk of discovery, to exercise the right of unfettered criticism, and – this seemed to be part of the deal – to accept the loneliness of autonomy.[16] The scholars of the Frankfurt School agreed with this Enlightenment ideal, but asserted that capitalism obstructed this emancipation process. Thus, they set themselves the task of revealing the inherent faults of capitalism. Critical theorists must unearth and highlight the shortcomings of contemporary society and confront it with a utopian idea of a perfect society, where everyone can realize his or her capacities to the full. Habermas fully agreed to this. It is his political ambition to bring about real emancipation by way of a critical social philosophy, always along the road of non-violence, for he is convinced that the use of violence is the final defeat of Reason.[17]

In the perception of the Frankfurt School, these ideals cannot be achieved with the help of applied research on certain policies, as this runs the danger of serving political manipulation. Typical research questions such as how to increase the standard of living for certain categories, how to improve inner cities, how to improve education and health care are to be avoided. Although these studies can be useful in some way, they cannot replace the broad and fundamental perspective of critical theory. First and foremost, critical theory is geared towards exposing why certain research questions have gained priority over others, why certain issues are ignored or not taken into consideration. Such an analysis should lead to a debate that succeeds in making choices about research priorities on a more rational and democratic basis.

11.3  Critical theory

Martin Jay has written an excellent book on the history of the Frankfurt School.[18] The true origins of Critical Theory go back to mid-19^th century, when successors of Hegel applied his philosophy to the social and political situation of Germany, then a rapidly modernizing society. Also, the Frankfurt School adhered to an approach that integrated philosophy with social analysis. They were concerned with the dialectical method devised by Hegel and amended into a materialist orientation by Marx. However, almost one century later the field of philosophy had changed enormously. Not only Karl Marx, but also Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Edmund Husserl had criticized Kant and Hegel. Of course, the ideas of these outstanding philosophers had influenced the fellows of the Frankfurt School. Even more important were the vital changes in social, economic, and political conditions. Capitalism had entered a new phase dominated by growing monopolies and increasing governmental intervention in the economy. Already in the thirties it had become clear that the Soviet Union was not as successful as most Marxists had hoped for. Another hot item was the gradual integration of the proletariat, which dampened the revolutionary spirit of the working class. Most workers had turned into consumers. Now they had much more to lose than their chains. This was especially true for the United States, as the members of the Institute could easily observe after their move from Nazi-Germany.

In the 1920s, the signs were still unclear. The political system of the Soviet Union wasn’t yet transformed into a Stalinist dictatorship. At the time, Max Horkheimer was still convinced that large sections of the proletariat would serve as a revolutionary class, although Lukàcs was of the opinion that the true interests of the workers was represented by the (reformist) socialist party. In the thirties, when the Institute resettled at Columbia University, it changed its tone. In the American context its authors avoided words like ‘Marxism’ and ‘communism’. They were substituted by terms such as ‘dialectical materialism’. Not only because they did not want to offend their hosts, but also because this subtle change expressed a growing loss of confidence in some Marxist dogmas. Marxism was not completely abandoned. Other philosophical notions had been incorporated to develop a new theoretical perspective, fit to make the new situation intelligible.[19] Horkheimer, who set the tone for all research at the Frankfort Institute, was deeply influenced by his mentor Hans Cornelius. He tended to agree with Cornelius’ cultural pessimism:

“Men have unlearned the ability to recognize the Godly in themselves and in things: … Therefore their lives flow meaninglessly by, and their shared culture is inwardly empty and will collapse because it is worthy of collapse.”[20]

11.3.1       The positivism debate: Objectivity and value-neutrality?

At the German sociological convention of 1961 Karl Popper and Theodor Adorno were critically feuding on the issue of positivism. This was the start of the so-called Positivism War.[21] Since the seminal work of Auguste Comte, positivistic science has been identified with objectivity and value neutrality. It is directed at the study of observable phenomena and the search for general laws that can explain ‘positive’ facts. Anti-positivists contend that this empirical-analytical method is not applicable within the social sciences, or only to a limited degree. As people are – in a relative sense in any case – free, creative thinkers and agents, their behaviour can hardly ever be predicted. Hence, social and historical processes can never have the high level of predictability that is characteristic for the ‘actions’ of matter, plants, or even animals. As far as we are able to detect relatively fixed patterns of social behaviour, these are only valid within the limits and constraints of specific historical periods and social conditions. Thus, anti-positivist are convinced that there can be no universal laws in the realm of social science like those that exist in physics.

An important bone of contention is the issue of value neutrality. Karl Popper makes an analytical divide between two domains: science and the rest of the world. Within science, values such as truth, objectivity, and scientific relevance are judged to be important. Popper acknowledged that science will always be committed to these typical scientific values. In that sense it is not value-free. This does not mean, however, that there is a license for a science to be partisan and value-ridden. There is always the duty, for the scientific community, to labour industriously in order to achieve these objectives as best as possible. Popper realized that absolute objectivity is unattainable, just as it is impossible to become absolutely certain about the general validity of any theoretical statement about reality. But scientists should never sacrifice these scientific values for the sake of non-scientific values, such as the interests of any social category or political ideal, because that would pave the way for all kinds of biases. Like Adorno, Habermas rejects Popper’s analytical division between scientific and non-scientific values. In practice, the ideal of a value-free science means that one should try to remain unaffected by cultural traditions, political affinities, or loyalty towards one’s friends, colleagues, and relatives. For sure, Weber has meant it that way. But Habermas does not accept this socially constructed demarcation.

Popper agreed that his preference for upholding scientific values such as logical reasoning, objectivity, and inter-subjective testability is based on “an irrational belief in Reason”. Precisely this is the point made by Habermas. He thinks that Popper has been too quick in concluding that it is possible, in science, to separate reason from ethics, just as science and politics, or facts and (non-scientific) values cannot really be kept apart. Popper had agreed that good science needs good ethics, as researchers should always strive for objectivity. Only severely tested theories can be accepted as valid theories until they are refuted or surpassed by a better one. So, the progress of science depends on a rigorous control executed by the forum of scientists. What is considered to be a scientific truth depends on the prevailing opinion or even on power relations within a particular field or paradigm. This can prevent the breakthrough of new and better explanations. Popper had always believed in the evolution of science by the process of trial and error elimination. He felt supported by the history of science that reveals a host of instances of long cherished and fiercely defended dogmas that sooner or later had to be replaced by better theories.

Habermas thought that the exclusion of social values leads to an unacceptable restriction of the field of scientific research. Segregation from the political and moral domain could lead to disasters such as the holocaust. For example, marketing research and opinion polls give the impression that all individuals have a say in the matter of production or politics. But such studies are merely used to facilitate the manipulation of consumers or voters. The real questions for critical research are: Why are these investigations carried out, financed, and with what objectives? These types of questions are not tackled within the traditional, positivist and non-critical research programs.[22]

Critical theorists are self-appointed observers of social science. Of course, there is nothing wrong with an in-depth investigation into negative effects of positivistic research. But Adorno’s attack, supported by Habermas, wasn’t a successful attack on all marketing research, let alone on all positivistic social research. Not all of them are useless. Some outcomes of marketing research can prevent unwise investments, or lead to products that better match the needs of consumers. Positivistic research may lead to improvements of labour conditions, fewer traffic accidents or preventions against severe illnesses.

11.3.2       Manipulation or emancipation?

It appears that Habermas had two perspectives on positivism. On the one hand, he stated that empirical quantitative research can produce useful knowledge. It reveals for instance how many people live below the poverty line or which categories of workers become ill from bad working conditions. Such hard data can inform a critical analysis of society, or support political struggles for more equality, health, or well-being. On the other hand, Habermas strongly opposed this type of research because it might lead to manipulation. Managers can use these outcomes to improve working conditions for higher productivity and profits, rather than for improving the well-being of workers. Yet, both parties may profit from this type of research. In similar vein, powerful politicians can use the results of poverty research to diminish poverty, not from Samaritan motives to help the poor, but simply for reasons of maintaining social order.

The results of empirical positivistic research may be used in diametrically opposed ways. When a positivist has established some scientific law, he will ber able to tell that certain causes will produce certain effects under specific conditions. Such a law can inform us what to do in order to arrive at a desired situation. However, after learning the operation of this law-like relationship political activists can prevent certain processes from happening.

The attack at positivism has created a remarkable paradox. On the one hand it asserts that positivistic research cannot lead to useful knowledge, because social processes are far too complex to apply methods from the ‘hard’ sciences in a meaningful way. On the other hand it asserts that the outcomes of such research can be put to use for all sorts of manipulative ends. Habermas, rather subtly, acknowledged that positivistic methods can be profitable in some cases, although the danger of abusing outcomes of research is never out of sight. He was right on both counts. But, because he was convinced that we live in a ‘wrong’ world, a world where negative tendencies prevail, he feared that abusive use of research would prevail. In his view, immanent laws (sic) of industrially advanced societies lead to an escalation of technical control over nature, men, and their social relations. In this complex social system the negative tendencies of positivistic science, technology, industry, and public government are interlocked and reinforce each other.[23]

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11.3.3       Should we study aspects of society or its totality?

Adorno asserted that survey research only produces aggregates of subjective opinions. It isolates the particular from the general and never arrives at a study of the ‘real’ object of sociology: society as a totality. Critical theorists cannot be content with studying only small segments of society, and wish to probe society in its ‘totality’. Ideally, their research is concerned with a central question: “Why are citizens alienated from contemporary society? Why don’t they perceive society as their society, a society that is also functioning for them? Why do they perceive society as a rather alien organic whole that reproduces itself according to inherent mechanisms, to a dynamic of its own, without any reference to human goals?”[24] In the ordinary practice of so-called critical research this is conveniently scaled down to questions about the occurrence of alienation, ethnocentrism, and authoritarianism among specific categories. Most followers of the Frankfurt School only used a limited number of positivistic instruments such as the F-scale that was developed in a well-known study of The Authoritarian Personality.[25]

Ostentatiously there is an enormous contrast between the scorned study of social ‘bits and pieces’ and the study of totalities, but in practice no one can study the whole totality of societies. In view of our limited knowledge, scarce financial resources, and lack of time we all have to make do with the investigation of parts of social structures or processes. The claim of approaching social existence as a totality can only mean that one pretends to study broader questions, questions concerning more crucial social issues and covering more aspects than is customary in social research. In practice, critical sociology has committed itself to studies that have the potential to reveal the contradictions of capitalist societies or studies that could foster the emancipation of the oppressed and underprivileged.

Habermas takes the angle that we can only intuitively grasp the whole of social life. A dialectical approach conceives the context of social life as a totality that not only influences the objects of research, but also the researcher, including the way a research project is set up and executed. Hence, we have to interpret every social phenomenon from the perspective of this totality. But this leads to a circular logic, from which it is difficult to escape. As Salman Rushdie says in The Ground beneath her Feet, you can only see the whole picture if you step out of the frame. Social scientists can never step out of the frame of society, like theological exegetes cannot step out the frame of their holy books. This is known as the hermeneutic circle or dilemma. The entirety of a work is to be understood from the individual words and their connections, and yet the full understanding of the individual words already presupposes the full understanding of the whole. Of course, understanding everything will never happen, so we have to pursue the process of interpreting the social world by taking one step at a time. Especially at the start we will make many mistakes. As we go on, some of these failures become visible because they do not match with other observations and interpretations, creating the need to go back, reconsider, and venture new interpretations.[26] = = = = = = = = =  

Clearly, we should be more modest in our objectives. It certainly is plausible that we can only come to grips with social reality, if we have acquired sufficient foreknowledge about this reality, so that the right schemes, classifications, and concepts can be selected. Otherwise, we will soon learn that our approach does not fit reality, will be rather fruitless or bring us only a tiny step along. Though there will always be lacunae in our pre-understanding, there is no other way. In the end, then, there is not much of a difference from Popper’s model of the growth of scientific knowledge through trial and error-elimination.[27]

The founders of the Frankfurt School knew very well that it is impossible to step out of the frame of society. They fully realized that sociology, including critical sociology, is always embedded in the very society it wants to analyze. Therefore, critical sociologists are or should be constantly aware of the strong ties with their own social context. Otherwise they run the risk of unreflectively using the dominant social perspective. And, according to Marx, that is the perspective of the ruling class.

11.4  Knowledge and interests

In his inaugural speech Habermas launched another head-on attack at the supposed objectivity and value neutrality (Werturteilsfreiheit) of positivistic science. His main argument is that personal, social or political interests have an influence on all scientific statements. Always, specific social interests fuel the search for new knowledge. The viewpoints we have when approaching reality have their roots in our own evolution, history, and culture.[28] They are connected to three anthropological media: work, language, and power. These media are the most important means of collective socialization.[29] Therefore, Habermas distinguishes between three paradigms of science, each with a specific view on methodology and the validity of scientific knowledge: the positivistic or empirical-analytical approach, the historical hermeneutic approach, and the critical approach. The first type is related to the sphere of work and has a technical interest, directed at gathering insights that could lead to practical knowledge. It wants to improve production, transport, medicine, services, and so on. This cognitive orientation propels the development of the physical sciences. It has a deeply rooted interest in explaining, predicting, and controlling. Positivists are convinced that they are discovering objective knowledge that is not related to any other interest than the growth of knowledge. They do not question the social framework of their practices and overlook that they deliver the means for carefully planned interventions in our way of life and its natural context. In other words, the knowledge interest of positivistic science is a strong concern with control.

Scheme 11.1         The connection between science and knowledge interest

The second type is connected with an ethical interest. People have a universal need for mutual understanding and respect. However, during the long march of evolution, societies have evolved in ways that produce and reproduce much inequality, misunderstanding, mistrust and conflict. Without communal interpretation, individuals are not able to live together harmoniously. Therefore, a good interpretation of each other’s background, culture and way of thinking is crucial. The third type of science has an interest in social critique and emancipation. Its main objective is to enhance critical reflection on society, and self-reflection. This should liberate individuals from repressive social conditions that severely restrict their full development.[30]

Positivistic or empirical-analytical scientists only acknowledge theories based on a system of statements that allow the deduction of testable hypotheses. They make predictions about relations between observable facts. When these predictions are confirmed, they see this as a corroboration of their theory and feel safe to base certain actions on these theories. Their ‘objectivistic illusion’ is founded on observations expressed in basic propositions that are supposed to be immediately evident. Habermas, however, renounces the idea of an objective reality separate from observers. In his view, even basic empirical facts are socially constituted. Our entire experience is formed within the functional sphere of instrumental reason, where the divide between subjects and objects is taken for granted. A critical social science will always investigate whether theoretical statements refer to real laws of social action or whether they merely formulate ideologically fixed relations.[31]

The hermeneutic tradition approaches reality by recognizing, interpreting, and positioning meanings and objectives of individuals (Sinnverstehen) or texts. Interpretative sociologists place themselves within the frame of reference of those individuals they are studying, or within the cultural context of a certain text. But here too the facts are only constituted in relation to the criteria for perceiving them. Just like positivists forget to make the relation between method and purposeful actions explicit, hermeneutics ignore inherent meanings and opinions that are part of their own situation as researcher. This ‘foreknowledge’ shapes the production of hermeneutic knowledge. The world of historically transmitted meanings becomes intelligible to interpreters only to the extent that it clarifies their own world. Interpretation creates a form of communication between both worlds; one discovers the meaning of transmitted information, by applying the tradition to oneself and one’s own situation. Hermeneutic research generates insights that are motivated by an interest in the continuation of consensus and mutual understanding. Habermas calls this the practical knowledge interest. Rather surprisingly Habermas, the great champion of consensus building, also criticizes the hermeneutic perspective.

The phenomenologist and hermeneutic Edmund Husserl were convinced that positivistic science had cut the connection between pure theory and social practice, between theoria and praxis. Positivists viewed the world as an objectively existing universe of real facts, with inherent and interrelated laws of cause and effect waiting to be discovered. But, according to Husserl, the knowledge about the world is based on a pre-scientific sphere, on the unquestioned evidences of our life-word. Hence, objectivity is an illusion. Nonetheless, he believed that his brand of phenomenology had hacked itself loose of all social interests because of its strictly reflective disposition. He put self-reflection on a par with pure theory in the classical sense, that is, a theory purified from all those variable, mutating, and insecure factors that characterize social praxis. But Habermas thinks that Husserl became a victim of a kind of objectivistic reasoning that has always been present in the traditional view on theory.[32]

The critique of ideologies assumes that revealing information about all kinds of power relations can initiate a mental process that may change the stage of unreflective consciousness that is part and parcel of social regularities. Critical theory can destroy these law-like relationships. Unscrupulous self-reflection can emancipate social agents from the dependency of social powers. Therefore, critical theory is determined by an emancipatory interest. The interests that guide the acquisition of knowledge are closely connected to the existential functions of human beings who are conditioned to accept their social situation, and have developed a personal identity in the midst of the primordial and ubiquitous conflict between individual motives and social constraints. Thanks to our capacity for critical self-reflection we are able to see the connection between particular types of knowledge and specific interests. That capacity cannot eradicate this knowledge-interest, but, in a way, it can surpass it. In other words, critical self-reflection unites the search for knowledge for the sake of emancipatory knowledge interests.

Habermas could have gone one step further, an important synthetic step, if he had subsumed the technical and practical knowledge interests under the all-covering interest of emancipatory knowledge. But then he would have had to acknowledge more fully that the methods of logical positivism and hermeneutical interpretations can produce useful and even necessary knowledge that may help to emancipate people, especially when emancipatory interests are involved in selecting the topics for research. His view was unnecessarily biased as he overlooked the positive sides and potentials of other paradigms. It is hard to see how people ever could have become aware of real forms of oppression, exploitation, and alienation, without making this apparent with the help of facts, discovered by positivistic methods. It is also hard to see how people suffering from cultural, religious or political indoctrination can be raised to awareness without the help of interpretative explanations of processes that have created, reproduced and legitimated inequality and oppression in a long social-historical process.

Scheme 11.2: Empowering Emancipatory Social Theory

For Michel Foucault it was not enough to gather historical, empirical and theoretical knowledge that could be offered as mental food for the underprivileged in the hope that it would mobilize them into action and emancipate them. He wanted social scientists to apply their newfound knowledge in political actions that would actually help to destroy the power of the powerful and mitigate social oppression and human suffering. In Making Social Science Matter Bent Flyvbjerg explains some of the differences between the work and the goals of Foucault and Habermas, and argues strongly in favour of a what he calls phronetic social science, that is a science that actually engages in political actions that bring about change, while using their scientifically acquired knowledge, based on highly reliable data, thoroughly scrutinized and analyzed, and valid theoretical arguments. The phronetic approach shows a strong political commitment by tackling questions the following crucial questions: (1) where are we going; (2) is this desirable; and (3) what should be done? But because of this clear lack of value neutrality and the urge to make a difference that matters, they must be able to base their actions on the outcomes of solid positive science. Otherwise, their arguments would make no impression whatsoever with those who are in power. Without a solid scientific basis they would have no authority at all and their actions would become futile.[33] 

11.5  Risks and opportunities of the technical revolution

In his first works about industrial society Habermas directed our attention to new forms of pauperism. He asserted that the gain of less tiresome physical work was cancelled out by an increased psychological strain. The work speed had been raised and for many workers their job had become even more monotonous. He welcomed the increase of income and leisure time because workers need much leisure time to recuperate from the strains of their work, but more pay is only a meagre compensation for the lack of work satisfaction. These rewards were only surrogate solutions, as the real problems were long working hours and mind-numbing jobs. At the time, Habermas hoped for a conscious reduction of consumption in order to decrease production. Hence, he advocated the restriction of advertising, for it only created artificial needs. He also hoped that talented industrial designers would ‘package’ all new technical products in such beautiful forms, that consumers would become emotionally attached to them and use them carefully, so that they would last longer. Later on, he directed his hopes towards the ecological movement that also argued for a more frugal way of life. Political objectives like these are closely linked to his rejection of an instrumental exploitation of nature and his advocacy of good stewardship.

11.5.1       Degeneration of praxis[34]

Unfortunately, most people with boring jobs are rather uncreative and inactive as soon as they go home. So, the real solution was to make work more challenging, more diversified and interesting. This demands a form of ‘social rationalization’ that stands diametrically opposed to purely technological or economical rationalizations. Social rationalization is a serious attempt to create an optimal situation for both workers and employers. It wants to prompt a successful combination of the economical demand for higher productivity with the social demand for healthy and satisfying working conditions. At first, this Human-Relations-movement introduced popular easy listening for workers at the assembly line. Another method was organizing all kinds of leisure activities for employees. Yet, empirical studies showed that a pleasant work climate was not sufficient. Workers should have a greater say in matters such as their work conditions, their workload, the division of tasks, and the distribution of responsibilities. Only diversification of tasks and greater autonomy and responsibility would diminish the dullness of repetitious work. Besides, studies had shown that a one-sided emphasis on technical and economic rationality might lead to a decrease in productivity. It could make workers sick, disabled or stressed as a consequence of the ever-increasing demands for more efficiency and higher productivity. Social rationalization often demands a lower work pace and a less efficient structure of organization, because people need some latitude for restoring their energy, for socializing, and for a more humane organization of work. Anyhow, Habermas soon realized that instrumental rationality would not correct itself. The economic rationality already had gone too far. It had become too dominant and infected all aspects of social existence.

In industrial society the laws of reproduction demand an ever-growing technical control over nature and an increasingly refined steering of human actions. In such a system, positive science, technology, industrial business and public administration are closely interlocked. Within this context theory can only prove itself by means of a rational application of techniques that are required for empirical research.[35] Rationality is restricted to a ‘neutral’ application of the method of science, and, at a policy level, to the predictive and technological application of the knowledge that it produces. Its only function is the reinforcement and refinement of methods that will realize those policy goals. But these objectives can never be justified by a scientific theory. That is why positivistic scientists leave the solution of political and moral problems to non-scientists. Thus, many problems remain unanalyzed and many political decisions remain highly subjective. Effective social theory no longer is directed at arousing the consciousness of the people but at deceitful manipulation. Although even a fully rationalized society cannot dispense with social or moral issues, no effort is made, alas, to solve such issues by bringing about a rational consensus to improve the human condition.[36]

This is why Habermas criticized positivism once again. He believes that positivism conceals its strong commitment to technical rationality behind a veil of value-neutrality. Everywhere positivistic scientists are searching for empirically testable proofs, dismissing all alternative methods as unscientific and meaningless. But there are many situations where we have various options that are equally valid. At such moments we need a second order rationalization to make a valid choice. This can be done with the help of a decision theory, which outlines what rules can be used to select certain specific procedures and set priorities. Decision theory does not shed light on the content of alternatives, but clarifies how the pros and cons of each alternative can be weighed. It will not consider the value-loaded basis of various choices. So, there will always be a kernel of ‘irrationality’ in the orientation on values, objectives, and needs. If we cannot solve this problem, then there is a big chance that hard criteria of efficiency and profitability will get the upper hand. So, there is no other option than to try to arrive at some sort of compromise or an expression of the will of the majority.

Habermas denounced Niklas Luhman’s systems theory as just another variant of second order rationality. Here too a central value is advanced, namely the continuation and reproduction of the system. Systems analysis concerns itself with improving the functioning of systems and facilitating its continuation, by enhancing stability and adaptability. Thus, it serves as an apology for the present state of society. It merely is a theory for technocratic use that eliminates the distinction between Technology and Praxis.[37] For Habermas, the idea of a cybernetic self-regulating organization of social life is the worst form of technocratic thought. In this ‘negative utopia of technical control over history’ man no longer appears as a homo faber, who realizes himself through his products and achievements. He is a homo fabricatus, a fabricated being, completely integrated in the technical system. The classical perspective on society, as a system of interactions between people that organize their life in a conscious way, is discarded for the sake of an ‘instinctual self-stabilization of social systems’. In this approach, the emancipation of individual citizens will not have a high priority.[38]

In spite of everything, Habermas still believes in the creation of a better world, a world where people really can be free and equal. Those who support technocratic models of science remain aloof from public discourse. In the decision model, citizens can only legitimize governmental decisions by way of periodic local or national elections. The process of decision-making is kept out of the domain of a rational public debate. Systems theory rationalizes decision-making at the cost of democratization, as power is delegated to professionals and experts. This leaves the public domain emasculated: all its functions are taken away, except that of legitimating the government. A complete victory of the technocratic model implies the definitive defeat of liberal democracy. But we have not arrived at the end of history yet. In view of the problems of contemporary welfare states, there is an urgent need for research programs that will turn the tables and return power to the people.

11.5.2       Democratization and emancipation through constraint-free dialogue

New technologies create new possibilities. These, in turn, may raise new needs, norms, and values, furthering technological development without governmental planning. This largely unplanned process should be made explicit in order to perceive that social interests are subjected to technological and economical interests. But how can the relation between technological progress and social conditions be analyzed and brought under the control of a rational discussion?[39] Rational discourse should not only be directed at the improvement of technical products and gadgets, but should also take into account the social and moral implications of technological progress.

There is a great need for the kind of critical reflection that relates potential technological developments to political goals. But it is precisely this type of reasoning that is overlooked by a technical rationality, because it dismisses any non-technical discourse about social priorities as unscientific. Thus, it fulfils the ideological function of obscuring the social interests that actually determine technological developments. Without critical reflection new technologies unexpectedly penetrate into existing cultural patterns and social activities, exacerbating the mismatch between unbridled technical control and unreflected objectives, fossilized systems of values, and outdated ideologies.[40] A well-considered mediation between technical progress and social action can only be realized when the process of political decision is grounded in a public, constraint-free discussion. Such a debate has to scrutinize issues that have not been discussed earlier. The traditional preconception (Vorverständnis) of historically determined practical interests and needs should come to the surface, and earlier social interests that had not been analyzed before will have to be made explicit. The same is true for norms and values, since economic, political, and social interests also determine them. By uncovering the ideologically legitimized repression of collective interests, Critical Theory contributes to the re-interpretation and re-valuation of certain needs and corresponding goals, norms, and values. In this sense, becoming aware of technological potential is an essential aspect of political emancipation.

From a democratic perspective, all the proposed technical solutions should be evaluated with reference to the future context where its practical consequences will be felt. Only then, can sensible decisions about the expansion of our technical potentialities be made.[41] Habermas sees democracy as the institutionally guaranteed form of public communication concerning questions of how people can and want to live. At the centre is the idea of a permanent communication between the sciences and public opinion. Public opinion should be formed on a basis of unrestricted acquisition of information and a completely free discussion of matters of general interest. Then it acquires a control function concerning the application of technological knowledge in an emancipatory social practice. In a real democracy everybody has the opportunity to participate in public debate. It is the opposite of manipulation of the masses by a great leader. The big difference between Habermas and all his predecessors at the Frankfurt School is that he tenaciously maintains a union between liberalism and democracy. Although he is extremely critical about the current state of affairs, he will never forsake this ideal-typical form of democracy.

The idea of a constraint-free dialogue (herrschaftsfreie Dialog) was inspired by the free and democratic climate of English coffeehouses, French salons, and German Table Societies. In these places there was a free exchange of thoughts about literature, art, and politics. There was an atmosphere of parity, as all forms of domination had been switched off, except “the non coercive domination of the better argument”.[42] Public opinion took shape in these gatherings and gnawed at the dead wood buttressing the absolute power of states, kings or princes. But in the course of the nineteenth century the stark division between state and society gradually became smaller. Policy making organizations and interest groups began to co-operate more and more. All sorts of things were arranged underhanded, bypassing official political channels and procedures. Thus a social midfield was created between the state and private life worlds. As a consequence the private life world (Lebenswelt) shrank to the intimate sphere of family life at home. Thus, the consensus that should be established in the field of politics was replaced by political compromise.

Habermas underwrites the analysis of Carl Schmitt, who stated that the public discussion in parliament had squandered its potentials. More and more, important decisions were precooked in back rooms and corridors, reducing the parliamentary debate to a pantomime where politicians glibly tried to sell their party’s position to the general public. The critical function of parliament had lost its purpose, and the public was offered some political pillow fighting, just for show. This sketch of political proceedings is over seventy years old, but still valid.[43] In reaction to the decline of liberalism and democratic processes, Schmitt had concluded that the days of democracy were over. He argued for a return of a strong state, towering over the scramble of fighting political parties. His ideas offered theoretical support for the undemocratic ideas of German National Socialists. Although Habermas supported Schmitt’s analysis of the decline of parliamentary democracy, he flatly rejected his recommendations for a new, far less democratic system. Instead, the weakened democratic procedures should be revitalized. Backroom politics should come out in the open to become public again. Then all political interactions and negotiations can be made controllable and widely discussed. In view of the strong conflicts of interest that surround any given topic, however, it will not be easy to reach the desired rational consensus. Therefore, Habermas revisits the theoretical problem of reaching a rational consensus in his magnum opus Theory of communicative action.

11.6  The theory of communicative action

In the mid-seventies Habermas shifted his interest from the question of what divides society to what keeps it together. In his view, the formation and maintenance of consensus through communicative action cements society. Already, this perspective had been explored before, but now it was given the full treat of his scholastic skills. The result was a book of well over 1100 pages, titled: Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns. This is the most central work of his entire oeuvre. For a start, it is a systematic reconstruction of classical social theory. Habermas thoroughly discusses many important ideas of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Mead and Parsons, at least to the extent that they bear on his own theoretical project.[44] But the book has much more to offer. It aims, among others, to solve the problem of rationality. For Habermas the essence of rationality is argumentation, that is, the ability of supplying good reasons for arriving at a common opinion on the basis of sound argumentation. The most crucial element of his vision is that rational argumentation should not be restricted to a discussion of facts only, but should also be concerned with social norms and personal feelings. Thus, our current one-dimensional rationality could be re-established as a broad communicative rationality, that is, rationality aimed at establishing a soundly based consensus (Verständigung) built on free discourse. A fair and ordered society is possible only on the basis of communal definitions of social reality, produced by communicative action. The more we deviate from this ideal typical situation, the more social constraints will emerge.

Habermas wants to connect the micro-sociological analysis of speech acts with the macro-sociological analysis of social systems. The problem is that adherents of both camps denunciate each other. At best, they confiscate some theoretical element of the other paradigm to use it in their own approach, albeit in a subservient role. Even a full-blooded synthesizer as Talcott Parsons allowed the systems approach to get the upper hand. Habermas tries to avoid this pitfall by strictly applying both theoretical approaches to the domains for which they are suited. He analyzes the symbolic production and reproduction of the informal life world with the conceptual tools of agency theories, and the material production with the help of the systems approach. He is able to shed more light on the economic and political intrusions on our life world.[45] Obvious examples are the demands of employers that want employees to work overtime so that they have to forsake family duties or civil servants that are asked to control whether individuals on social assistance are not sharing their house and bed with someone who could provide for a regular income.

Because Habermas held on to his belief in social progress, a collision with postmodernism was on the cards. Postmodernists no longer believe in the ‘Grand Narratives’ of progress after the horrific events of the holocaust, the atrocities of the regimes of Stalin and Mao Zedong, or the killing fields of Cambodia. Of course, Habermas had also become sceptical about the great ideologies that offer a wonderful future for mankind. He rejected the Marxian theory that capitalism will irrevocably lead to a great revolution followed by a heavenly communistic world order. The form and content of social evolution is unpredictable and will be contingent with chance occurrences, for the logic and dynamic of development do not strongly hang together. The dynamic mainly depends on unpredictable events. The basis of social evolution is, according to evolutionists such as Kant and Elias, our ability to be critical of our situation, and to generate new knowledge whenever we want to solve concrete practical problems. This process is propelled by the accumulation of knowledge that we can pass on to new generations and by the expansion and refinement of networks of communication. Eventually this will lead to a critical consideration of what is taken for granted in our life world. Thus, our life world will be freed from obsolete traditions, foolish superstitions, narrow-minded prejudices and false dogmas. However, this will engender a differentiation in worldviews, ideologies, and opinions that entice a great need for consensus about the validity of specific standpoints.

The concept of developmental logic has been borrowed from Piaget, the famous specialist of the cognitive and moral development of young children. Habermas transposes this concept to social groups, and even to the cognitive, moral, and esthetical development of mankind. Development occurs whenever completely new concepts replace central concepts from an earlier period. Following Piaget, Habermas speaks of decentring. In this process old categories lose their value and are replaced. An entirely new level of development is reached when the capacity to distinguish between physical, moral and esthetical phenomena is further developed.[46] This collective learning process does not depend on the logic of development, but on the dynamic of social development. The dynamic of history is influenced by external circumstances such as technological, economic, and political conditions. This important distinction signifies that history, as it has unfolded itself, could have taken quite another route. In stark contrast to Marx’ theoretical predictions, our history has not followed a predetermined path.[47] Nonetheless, on the basis of historic events that lay behind us, many social scientists, social philosophers, and cultural commentators have sketched very bleak images of our future. They all expect that the negative trends will continue and even grow stronger, and they ignore all tendencies that could be interpreted in a more positive way. Habermas vehemently rejects the thought that all of it was unavoidable. Moreover, he keeps reminding us that there have also been positive developments. He is convinced that a greater good can come out of our social evolution, if we broaden rationalization. Moreover, with the help of medical and biological sciences we can overcome hunger and many lethal diseases. With the expansion and deepening of our knowledge of social systems and social processes we might get rid of oppression and inequality.

It sounds rather optimistic, and it does raise the question of why the process of rationalization had gone off course. Habermas tries to answer this question by presenting a rather convincing diagnosis of the problems of modern times. Once more he points at the dominance of instrumental rationality and the separation of social system and life world as the main source of all problems of modern, western societies. In principle there was nothing wrong with the development of instrumental rationality. It led to the growth of science, more efficient production, and a longer life expectancy. Compared to the Middle Ages, there has also been a striking abatement in social inequality. A negative tendency however was the colonization of the private life world by capitalism, state socialism, and government bureaucracies. These subsystems had gained so much power that they repressed communicative action with the forceful arguments of money and political power. Habermas put his hope on new social movements such as feminism, environmentalism and the peace movement, the new forces in waging the war against inequality. The new movements demand an open debate about other priorities such as equity, liveability, protection of nature, and people’s well-being and safety.

11.6.1       Pathologies of modern times

In Habermas’ view there is an increase of social pathologies. They are so obvious that he does not think it necessary to give further indications.[48] Besides, a whole array of renowned sociologists had already discussed major negative developments such as alienation, loss of meaning, commodification, reification, and an overdose of instrumental rationality culminating in wasteful production and relentless competition. This was ascribed to factors such as structural differentiation, specialization, and increased complexity. Social units had expanded and the traditional bonds of the tribes and lost their social function as cohesive forces. The trustworthy leadership of tribal chiefs and heads of extended families had shifted into the hands of ‘alien’ public authorities and their anonymous governors. The modern economic system had obliterated the autarkic, small-scale economies of extended families and tribes. The development of a global market resulted from the inherent logic of an economic rationality that is only focused on increasing profits and cutting costs. A similar inherent development arose from the logic of power, the logic focused on increasing the power of the powerful.

The natural sciences have secularized our worldview and shattered many traditional and sacral myths. Weber had revealed the co-dependency of the evolution of scientific thought and changing values on the one hand, and the development of capitalism and the modern state on the other. Habermas appreciates Weber’s broader conception of rationality because it encompasses not only instrumental rationality, but also value rationality. He had also acknowledged that social actions could be based on personal affections and social traditions. Nevertheless, he criticizes Weber for only using these concepts to explain individual actions. As soon as the latter refers to processes of rationalization in society at large, he restricts his analysis to the growing dominance of instrumental reason. This kind of analysis leads to sombre conclusions and predictions. For example, that people will lose any perspective on the meaning of life as a consequence of secularization. They will be thrown back on their own autonomy. Increasingly they will have to rely on their own insights and views. Although this implies emancipation from old dogmas, it also raises the risk of too much individualization, even to the extent that society could disintegrate. In contrast to this tendency, however, bureaucratization and growing social complexity will increasingly restrain individual freedom.[49] Later, Horkheimer and Adorno would share this gloomy outlook. Habermas, however, believed that these pessimistic views originated from an idealized image of the past. He supported their bleak sketch of historical developments in the first half of the twentieth century, but kept hoping for a counter movement and a better future, although his own sketch of our present-day world was in fact rather bleak too. Actually, he noticed that the strong differentiation and rationalization of society extended far beyond the mere formation of subsystems such as politics and economy. His central thesis was that even our private life world has been subjected to a process of rationalization. In other words, they were too colonized.

However, in line with his adage that both negative and positive factors spring from the same source, he still cherished the hope that our life world fosters a cure. In archaic societies all interpretative frames of reference were sanctified. Then, there was no distinction between different validity claims. Only in modern societies can we detect a fundamental cleft between the assertions of positive science, positive law and aesthetics. Historically, there has been a growing amount of valid definitions of situations. The belief in evil spirits and witches has died. Emotions have become more authentic; norms are more often consciously justified. In a better world, we do not have to pretend to be different from what we are. We can sincerely show our emotions, mention our strongest wishes and cherish our deepest desires. This evolution is inherent to communicative action. Potentially, what is here today has been there from the very beginning. People can observe and learn and are capable of detecting lies and insincerity, so they have the means to criticize others and correct deviant or insincere behaviour.

11.6.2       Colonization of the life world

As a consequence of the critique on traditional dogmas, people can no longer rely on fixed norms and definitions of reality. Now that the sacrosanct authority of tradition and religion has been undermined, communicative action has become more important than ever. But, with the growing complexity of the social system, political decisions are delegated to professional politicians and bureaucrats. This creates an independent political system that distances itself further and further from the life world. Even within the life world there is an ever-growing expansion of instrumental rationality and differentiation, partly because the subsystems of politics and economy penetrate ever more deeply into the private sphere of the social community. Strategic rationality determines the further development of the economy and the polity. Here power and money impose a sort of consensus instead of communicative action. Economic and political claims will be ‘accepted’ on the basis of positive and negative sanctions and not on a foundation of rational arguments. Economic and political power will drive out any consensus based on a fair and free dialogue. As authentic arguments lose their validity, power and money will become the only valid arguments. That is why Habermas speaks of an empirical instead of a rational co-ordination of social actions.

The lifeworld yields the sources for establishing mutual understanding. It is a reservoir of existing frames of reference and non-problematized basic convictions. Within the everyday lifeworld people present existing interpretations as valid statements about reality and assume that their partners are responsible beings. In turn, these interpretations are retained and reproduced through the confirmation of their validity and because the agent behaves in a social and responsible way. Habermas rejects purely culturalistic interpretations of the lifeworld. In his view, the lifeworld consists of people who are socialized as responsible social agents. It has institutions that regulate the solidarity within social groups. The lifeworld is therefore a subsystem of the entire social system. Apart from this symbolic reproduction, he also discerns a material reproduction of the lifeworld. Primarily, material reproduction is dependent on instrumental actions, whereas communicative actions take care of symbolic reproduction. They safeguard cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization. Thus, the three building blocks of the lifeworld – culture, institutions, and personalities – always remain available.

The lifeworld is a reservoir from which the economic and political system can draw labour and loyalty. Power and money are anchored in the lifeworld by a socially created sense of justice and a socially determined belief in the legitimacy of political relations. Colonization of the lifeworld occurs as soon as the economic and political systems are replacing the co-ordination of communicative action.[50] From their one-dimensional rationality, the economic and political subsystems are inclined to trespass into other domains and to colonize the informal lifeworld. This leads to all kinds of conflicts and pathological developments. Cultural traditions lose their function and coherence as soon as money and power bypass rational communicative arguments. Then, solidarity erodes, and processes of socialization run astray. This process of colonization engenders all the ills that characterize capitalistic societies. Nevertheless, Habermas holds on to an optimistic view on the possibilities of re-establishing a stable and well-balanced society. He has not lost his faith in the capacities of human beings. Precisely the astonishing development of instrumental reason fuels his optimism that other dimensions of rationality can be developed too. Because not all human potential has been used so far, there is a great need for a theory that can explain and erase the single-purposed unfolding of rationality, and bring about a more balanced form of social evolution.

11.6.3       The input of the philosophy of language

In his search for the cement of a just society Habermas turned to the philosophy of language. He maintains that social cohesion is established through linguistic interactions of people who want to come to an agreement. Consensus unites and disagreement divides.[51] This is called Verständigung and means agreement as well as shared understanding. But he wants a concept beyond this, Telos. This Greek word indicates that consensus is the inherent objective of language, that agreement is the primary goal of communication. Habermas strives for a social consensus, an elimination of cultural and social distinctions, because social distinctions are the main sources of social conflict. Therefore, he plunges whole-heartedly in a thorough analysis of communicative action. What happens when we communicate with each other? To say something is to do something. Often there are clear connections between words and deeds. Examples of the perlocutionary dimension are: ‘I will help you, I promise to visit you tomorrow’. So, most speech acts have a propositional and a performative dimension, expressing an expectation, a wish, a promise, an order or a demand. A perlocutionary effect refers to an effect on the hearer that is not grammatically coded by the speech act itself but that will be revealed to the interlocutor. The performative element is used to make clear how the propositional content has to be interpreted: for instance as a request, an order, a threat, or an insult.

We can say something about three worlds or domains and stand in a relation to these domains in different ways.[52] What we say may concern the objective, physical world (1), the social world (2) or the subjective, psychological world (3). For each domain, different validity claims are used. Statements about the physical world claim truth. Statements about social relations claim justness, and statements about personal feelings are based on a claim for authenticity.

         Scheme 11.3         Dimensions of reality and the criteria for validity

Take the following example. A daughter asks her old, lonely mother to move from the inner-city district where she has always lived, because it has deteriorated. Many houses have become derelict and the streets are unsafe, because of an increase in juvenile delinquency and other forms of crime. Already many people have moved to suburbs with better and bigger houses. Mainly the poor have stayed behind and immigrant families have moved in. Other groups have also taken over the empty houses, such as prostitutes and drug-abusers. The traditional form of social control has disappeared and occasionally there are reported cases of mugging, burglary and even shooting incidents. The daughter uses these objective and undeniable facts to convince her mother that it is no longer safe to stay there. The mother does not agree. She is very much attached to her house where she has raised her family and lived in for over forty years, and she asserts that it is still safe enough to keep on living in their old home. In response the daughter comes up with moral arguments. Now, she emphasizes that the neighbourhood has lost its good reputation, and this will affect the reputation of everybody who lives there, no matter whether they are decent people or not. To this her mother might respond that she still has good relations with some of the elderly neighbours and that she feels responsible for their well-being. She would hate to abandon these old friends who might desperately need their help and cannot do without their regular neighbourhood. So when moral arguments still cannot convince her mother, the daughter launches a new series of arguments, labouring on her mother’s feelings, by claiming that she is very worried about her safety. She even asserts that she is lying awake at night every time she reads about another case of mugging, or about shooting incidents. For Habermas it is of the utmost importance that the discussion will lead to a consensus, to an agreement and mutual understanding on the basis of a free, honest, and open exchange of arguments between equals, without the manipulation of facts, amoral arguments or insincere behaviour. [53]

11.6.4       Elements for discourse analysis

A critical discussion about arguments leads to a discourse about the claims for truth, moral justness and sincerity.[54] The difficulty is in finding arguments that are valid for everybody who has a stake in the matter. Discourse rules should have a universal character. If some statement or argument is countered, the foundations of these arguments will be put forward, and people will start to explain or justify their viewpoints. This raises the problem of sincerity, as there is no extrinsic reason to tell the truth, although telling lies only makes sense if the other assumes that you speak the truth. Habermas contends that a discourse about the validity of claims is only possible in an ideal speech situation, when everyone has an equal right to speak and has an equal right to put forward his arguments, when every participant is absolutely impartial and all participants have equal power. Only then consensus can be achieved.

Participants in a constraint-free debate have to cut themselves loose from all bonds with special interest groups or political parties. They even have to break away from their own culture. Such are the conditions for addressing objectively their own sincerity, prejudices, and biases. It is clear that this situation will never occur. It is an ideal-typical situation. Nobody can cut himself completely loose from his social and cultural background. Moreover, there shall never be enough time for discussing the validity of all the arguments that have been put forward. Lack of time also prevents us of getting cornered in an endless regression of arguments in defence of other arguments. For practical reasons, we will have to establish a common ground for those aspects of the discussion that are agreed on anyway, or can temporarily be put aside without further ado. Habermas thinks to find this common ground in the lifeworld.

Characteristic for communicative action is the opportunity for criticizing all definitions of the situation. As long as all participants are oriented towards the goal of mutual understanding, a rational consensus is attainable, in principle at least. But in many cases, psychological and cultural barriers block a free exchange of all types of arguments. In everyday reality we can only hope for conditions that approximate a situation of communicative symmetry.

11.6.5       Critique and counter-critique

Not every reader will be persuaded by Habermas’ model for communicative action and embrace the possibility of a peaceful and rational consensus, if only because we still live in a world full of inequality, social conflicts, and cultural differences. We are far removed from the necessary conditions for an ideal speech situation. Habermas is of course aware of this, but it will not stop him from looking for the ingredients that might produce the necessary conditions. Although the lifeworld is colonized by politics and the economy, it would still contain parts that are intact and have the potential to revitalize communicative action on a large scale. Habermas tends to fall into the same kind of trap as the romantic philosophers of the nineteenth century, who idealized the naturalness and harmony of the past. He idealizes the informal lifeworld and overlooks the possibility that it also contains forms of inequality, violence, and differences of opinions or contradictory interests that have not been imported by external processes. In reality, we often lack the necessary preconditions for a free and democratic discourse even in our informal life worlds. In addition, Habermas does not account for the false assumptions, distorted information, or invalid arguments that may inform consensus. Moreover, he seems to ignore that deep and extensive discussions may lead to an aggravation of conflicts, and reveal cultural or ideological differences that otherwise might have been glanced over.

Another line of critique is that Habermas puts too much emphasis on language as the main bond of society. Of course, language is very important in paving the way towards harmony and consensus, but traditions and customs, affiliations and affections, material possessions and interests can also divide or unite people. At the core of this critique is the questioning of the supposition that language has an inherent aim, an autonomous power to push us all towards consensus with all fellow human beings.[55] But, as has been mentioned before, linguistic interaction may also enlarge our conflicts and misunderstandings. We need more than the ability to speak with each other; we also need the will to come to an agreement. Some conflicts are so big that we need a strong motivation and much perseverance to solve them.

According to some critics, Habermas is inclined to view psychological problems solely as problems that have arisen from blocked communication and restricted rationality. By neglecting the inner drives of people, he arrives at a far too optimistic perspective on the possibilities of socialization and re-socialization that reconcile individuals to society. His view on mankind tends to be oversocialized and underpsychologized. Stephan Mestrovic, for example, argues that Habermas gives too much weight to the cognitive side of people at the cost of a better understanding of the emotional dimension.[56] This critique is partly beside the point, because it is Habermas who has drawn our attention to the validity of social and emotional arguments. But it is true to say that Habermas disregards emotions as the manifestation of our physical instincts or drives, such as lust and desire, and does not appear to recognize that there is no room for careful communicative action in urgent matters of life and death.

Another point of serious critique is the stark divide between the social system and the lifeworld, between the formal structures of society and the informal organization of our daily lives outside the domains of paid jobs and business relations. Thomas McCarthy, who has studied, commented, and translated much of Habermas’ work, makes a point of this. He criticizes the antagonistic sketch of both domains, as if the economy and the polity function purely on the basis of strategic reasoning and the private lifeworld on communicative action solely. A few observations suffice to see that within the domains of the economy and politics there is room for other forms of rationality than mere instrumental rationality, even though the latter is very dominant. The opposite is true for the informal domains of the life worlds. Moreover, both domains influence each other and are, in a sense, interdependent. Even the life worlds of individuals interact with the economy and politics. From time to time they distract instrumental reasoning from its purest forms so that other interests are taken into consideration. Obvious examples are the democratization movements in industry and other business organizations.

Against these critical observations Habermas has responded that he never meant to create an absolute demarcation between social systems and the lifeworld, although he admits that he might have given this impression in some of his texts. In principle all social phenomena can be analyzed from the perspectives of both lifeworld and social systems. Nevertheless, he believes that it is still meaningful to retain a conceptual distinction between social systems and lifeworld in order to describe and explain how society is changing and life worlds are colonized and ecological interests are sacrificed by economic and political systems. In his view, some phenomena can be better explained with a macro systems approach whereas and other social events ask for a micro lifeworld perspective.

A last critical remark of McCarthy is directed at Habermas’ use of systems theory. He thinks that the application of systems theory is lethal for a critical theory that is worth its salt. The systems approach is inherently focused on order, stability, and continuity, whereas social critique aims for change and revolution. Habermas counters that with the help of systems theory, he has clearly analyzed how modern society is turning means into political ends, with the consequence that meaningful goals have lost priority. Besides, he is convinced that his analysis exposes that the strategic actions of the political and economic system as detrimental for the reproduction of the symbolic structure of the lifeworld. Cultural traditions, social integration, and the socialization of young people can only be carried out by actions directed at mutual understanding, and not just with the help of power or money. “Meaning can’t be bought, nor extorted.”[57]

11.7  The struggle for recognition

We can only grasp what is involved in equal rights for women or ethnic minorities, when we listen to the specific demands and requests of these groups, so as to know what rights or which forms of unequal treatment are relevant.[58] Without such a discussion cultural differences and their consequences are easily trivialized or overcharged, distorted or ignored. This could lead to lawlessness or deprivation. Open democratic discussions create the opportunity for making clear which traditions minorities desire to prolong or abolish, how they wish to cope with their past, with each other and with nature.

Habermas endorses Amy Gutman’s view that the recognition of minorities includes respect for the unique identity of each individual as well as respect for his or her culture. Constitutional rights protect the integrity of individual citizens, but it is doubtful whether an individually oriented judicial system can handle the conflicts that arise from the clashes between majority and minority cultures, for these conflicts are about the expression and maintenance of collective identities.[59] Charles Taylor maintains that warranting collective identities is incompatible with individual freedom and the right to equal treatment. He takes the position of Quebec as an example. Separatist political parties in Canada’s francophone region have sought, in their demands for secession, to forbid the French part of the population to send their children to schools where English is the language of instruction, or have campaigned for proscribing that French should be the medium for communication in all enterprises with more than fifty employees. Taylor accepts that it can be necessary to put aside individual rights in order to warrant a collective right. Habermas disagrees however, because he has more affinity with individual liberal-democratic rights. He accuses Taylor of needlessly constructing an opposition.[60] Of course, he perfectly understands that individuals are social beings and that personal identity is interwoven with collective identity. But he argues that overstating the importance of collectivities will erode the basis for individualistic liberalism. Giving priority to collective identities will mitigate anyone’s freedom to act as he or she pleases.

However, according to Taylor it is acceptable to execute active policies so as to create members of a community within an endangered culture. In Quebec, these kind of political interventions boil down to the imposition to choose for a specific school and a specific curriculum and French as language of instruction. Habermas rejects this kind of coercive policies. He thinks they are unnecessary, for a correctly perceived theory of individual rights does take cultural background into consideration. On the other hand, he is rather critical towards individualistic liberalism for it ignores half of the concept of autonomy. The only way to acquire autonomy (in the sense of Kant) is by being able to see oneself as the constructor of the laws to which one is subjected. Conventional individualistic liberalism denies the common origin of personal and public autonomy. This is no trivial matter, but a conceptually necessary relation. In a true democracy people have made their own laws. They have been constructed on the basis of a free and open discussion. Citizens will only perceive laws as legitimate, if they are produced in this democratic way. Then they will realize that these laws have been established on their own request and in their own interest.[61] A constitutional democratic state has to take account of social inequality as well as cultural diversity. This is possible, if we grant individuals an inter-subjective identity. All human beings are socialized in their own culture, which in turn belongs to their personal integrity. That is why a constitutional state has to acknowledge the right to be different. If this is the case, then, according to Habermas, there is no need for a second form, a collective form of liberalism.

11.7.1       The feminist struggle for equal rights and equity

To acquire a better view on this issue, Habermas ponders the case of the women’s liberation movement, which shows that the fight for equal rights is far from transparent, because it also involves a fight for the right to be different. Time and time again we can observe that the advance of women’s rights is a tough dialectical process. After a while each victory turns out to be only a partial victory as formerly obscured inequalities come to the surface. Every step forward produces new inequalities, entices new antagonisms, and tends to trigger a backlash to boot. Think, for example, about the traditional situation of the core family in industrial societies. Because of the large differences between the roles of men and women, inequality had become manifest. The typical male had his job outside the home and was the sole provider.. The typical housewife was expected or even compelled to stay at home and look after the children and do the daily chores of housekeeping. The earnings of the husband were seen as family-income and spent on what was necessary for the whole family. So, from a purely financial perspective, it could be said that husband and wife were equally poor or equally rich. Nowadays, women have a paid job, whether they are married or not, whether they have young children or not. This has made them independent from the income of men. But women tend to have lower paid jobs than men. Even if they have the same type of jobs, they still receive lower salaries and are less often promoted. So today inequality in incomes has become much more manifest. New forms of welfare and social assistance have given another push in this direction. So, now women are more independent. As a consequence there also are more single-headed families. Also and closely connected to this is the concentration of poverty among single mothers. Once more, the fight has to be rekindled to get the process going. Equal rights, when realized, do not automatically lead to real equality and each new step ahead bring about new bones of contention.

There are two possible solutions to tackle the socially constructed, but very tenacious forms of inequality. Affirmative action can give women a head start on the labour market. The other way around is to compel men to take on more responsibilities in the domain of housekeeping and the care of children. For example, the Norwegian government has issued a law that obliges men to take their share of parental leave in case new babies are born in the family. This last approach is criticized by Habermas. He speaks of normalizing interventions that amount to a restriction of freedoms.[62][63] In this case the freedom of choice is limited for those women who prefer to claim the whole period of parental leave.

Habermas is sceptical about the idea of solving all social problems by legislation. As we have seen, the construction of laws that formally arrange for the equality of men and women did not produce equality in all respects. In reaction, many new laws and regulations have been issued to repair this, and many legal regulations in the field of work have been adapted to the new perspective on the social role of women. But even so, many forms of inequality remain. We tend to expect too much from legislation, but we should be careful with issuing new laws because they can generate unintended consequences and even become counterproductive. Again, Habermas emphasizes that laws have to be supported by the majority of the people or the majority of the relevant categories of people. Only an open and sincere discourse can pave the way for a fair distribution of professional work, housework and childcare. Such a discourse about housekeeping and childcare will have a strong impact on the socialization of children. It will influence the opinions, norms and values of the next generation. This could constitute a positive contribution to the solution of gender inequality.

The struggle for equal rights and recognition is a fight against repression, marginalization, and humiliation just like it is for ethnic groups. The feminist struggle is about the lack of consideration, both legally and informally, for gender specific differences. There is insufficient recognition for the self-image of women, their specific needs and their contribution to a common culture. The political struggle for recognition starts as a struggle about the right interpretation of gender-specific interests. Once this is achieved, the collective identity of women will have changed, and so will be the relations between men and women. It will certainly modify, if not damage, the self-image of men and lead to a critical discourse about the whole set of social values.[64]

11.7.2       The recognition of cultural rights of minority groups

An individual’s integrity can only be warranted if his cultural context is preserved. Every identity is intertwined with collective identities. It can only be stabilized when the cultural frame is stable, for example when it is embedded in or strongly related to a religion or a particular language. Therefore, liberal-democratic systems should offer ample opportunities for discussions about anyone’s identity. Each individual has cultural rights, that is, has the right to be and remain a member of a cultural group, because his identity is connected with a particular collective identity. As a consequence, certain group rights, such as a right to establish and maintain particular schools, churches, et cetera, should be respected. In particular, endangered minority cultures, such as that of the Inuit in Canada or the Maoris in New Zealand, can refer to special moral arguments when claiming support for their culture. In these cases, Habermas thinks that affirmative action might be necessary, although it is uncertain whether this will really help the survival of this particular minority culture. Its success will depend on the economical vitality of such a community and on the degree of attractiveness of the modern, majority culture.

Cultural traditions are transferred to new generations. During the process of socialization, personal identity is impregnated with the culture of the group. Usually, new generations will continue the culture of their parents and ancestors, in most cases without much critical reflection. However, multicultural societies urge people to evaluate and re-evaluate their culture whenever they are confronted with cultural alternatives. This is inevitable, unless minorities opt for almost complete segregation. The state can only create the right conditions for the reproduction and preservation of minority cultures, but it should not force citizens to reproduce their ancient traditions and lifestyle. That would deprive members of minority groups of the choice to either accept or reject their cultural heritage. In multi-ethnic and culturally pluralistic societies the notion of equal rights of coexistence implies that all citizens are assured that they can come of age in a social and cultural world that reflects the world in which they were born and raised. According to Habermas, everyone should have the right to continue in their own culture in a conventional way, or to opt for a way of life in another social group with a different culture. When the members of a group start to reflect upon their norms and values, customs and traditions, then only those cultural patterns will be preserved to which a close connection is felt. Nonetheless, Habermas thinks that minority cultures will change. Somehow they will adapt to the majority culture and will create a new lifestyle, a mix of old ethnic traditions shot through with the new ways of the majority. Research has shown that most immigrant groups will assimilate completely in the course of two or three generations.[65]

Habermas poses the question whether Welfare States have a right to choose a restrictive policy regarding immigration. He favours a lenient policy for the admission and naturalization of political refugees and economic migrants. He flatly rejects a policy of ‘Fortress Europe’ that keeps its doors closed to almost all sorts of immigrants. Yet he makes the observation that the preservation of the culture of the indigenous majority could be at risk if too many people from entirely different cultural backgrounds would immigrate in a short period of time. It would fuel the fear of the majority that they would become a minority in their own district, town or land. First Habermas tackles the issue of naturalization. Under which conditions does a state have the right to deny citizenship to immigrants? What may be demanded from immigrants with respect to adaptation and assimilation, in view of the integrity of the culture and lifestyle of the indigenous population? First and all, it is not improper to ask that immigrants consent with the Constitution. Militant fundamentalists who want to restrict certain constitutionally guaranteed rights could be denied entry to the country. Legal immigrants who have no objections against the constitutional principles of the country can be granted citizenship. They cannot be forced to give up all their cultural traditions, not even for the sake of naturalization, but might have to give up those traditions or views that go against the constitution of the host country. In theory, a naturalized immigrant group that has grown in number very strongly might in future claim constitutional amendments to bring the constitution in line with their heritage culture and religion. But this is a rather hypothetical case, because the change of constitutional laws often requires a two third majority in parliament. Moreover, generally we can observe that children and grandchildren of immigrant groups shift to the language, core values and lifestyle of the country of settlement.[66] We should also note that Habermas not only acknowledges the right of minorities to opt for the preservation of their own culture and traditions, but also the right to abandon old traditions and opt for the culture and lifestyle of the majority or any other group. Furthermore, he explicitly extends the right to retain one’s culture to the majority. This is quite remarkable, because this right tends to be discussed in relation to minority groups only, perhaps because most people think that the preservation of the majority culture is no problem, because the percentage of immigrants is and probably will stay relatively low.

There is another aspect in the debate between Taylor and Habermas that deserves some comment. Both seem to think that the preservation of cultural traditions depends on processes where members of minority groups consciously reflect and discuss all their options, collectively and individually, but seem to overlook that most cultural changes and cultural shifts occur in spontaneous and unplanned ways. Historical studies of processes of migration and settlement have shown that the children of immigrants quite easily adjust to many of the customs, norms, and values of the majority group. Like most specialists in the field of minority issues, both Taylor and Habermas tend to focus on normative aspects. Habermas’ approach is purely discursive and legalistic. The right to maintain one’s culture is one thing; however achieving this goal is quite another matter. It involves real commitment and active engagement, every day of the week, because the social and cultural environment is not very helpful in this respect. On the contrary, the culture and lifestyle of the indigenous majority might be very attractive to many immigrants, in particular to their children. Cultural maintenance requires a continuous process of cultural reproduction, restoration and reconstruction. Establishing minority rights merely is a necessary but insufficient condition for the maintenance of language and culture.

Habermas is fully aware of this; hence he advocates a lively discourse about the pros and cons of maintaining traditions, in order to enhance the cultural consciousness of all people. Such a discourse can lead to a greater awareness of the consequences of cultural reproduction, adaptation, and renewal. The outcome of such a discourse will be difficult to predict. Most certainly, it will not lead to the goals one has set, unless one opts for adaptation to the majority culture, for that is the easiest trajectory. If one seriously opts for cultural maintenance, then this will take the shape of a dialectical process, where the debate must go on perpetually, for the dynamics of social development demands reflection over and over again.

11.8  Modernizing modernity

The peak of the hype of postmodernism was in the eighties. In that decade the word postmodernism popped up in many a magazine and cultural section of the papers. The term has become very broad and vague. Yet, there are a number of ideas that generally are associated with postmodernism. First and foremost, the concept seems to imply that we have left the age of modernism and its concomitant optimism about human progress. Modernization refers to the rise and flowering of positive science and a strong emphasis on individualism and a decline of traditions. Modernity also refers to the development of technology and industry, capitalism and expanding state-bureaucracies. This coincided with a strong growth of the population and with migration and urbanization. In the field of art old conventions were replaced by new approaches. The chronological story line made way for flashbacks and flash-forwards. No longer were narratives focused on one main character; they became plural and open-ended. In modern literature as in psychology, the individual is no longer seen as an integrated personality, but as an extremely complex being with humane and inhumane characteristics. However, this seems to be characteristic of modernism and postmodernism.

Postmodernism settles the score with other sacred forms. It denounces the demarcation between high culture and low culture, between official or legitimized art that is exposed in museums or classical music played in concert-halls, and art-like expressions that we can observe in our daily life such as posters, ads, and cartoons. It does not accept a demarcation between high culture, middlebrow art such as photography and jazz, and forms of so-called low culture such as folk dance, naïve paintings, ads, comics, cartoons, or graffiti. Postmodernists reject the existence of a fundamental divide between great and classic and popular novels. To emphasize this eclectic attitude, post-modern art is characterized by an acceptance of a mix of different styles, matching romantic and figurative elements with the abstract and the surreal. The same is true for interior design and architecture. It is typical for postmodernists to make ample use of irony, parody, pastiche, and superficiality. They also seem to have abandoned the concepts of genius, depth, and originality.[67]

Within philosophy and the humanities, postmodernism became quite fashionable. It has left an imprint on the social sciences, in particular in the field of cultural studies. Favourite themes are relativism, instability, change, and the ephemeral. Postmodernists do not think that someone’s character or identity is stable. On the contrary, they expect changes all the time, as a consequence of changing social structures, values, friendships and other social relationships. Panta rei – Everything is in flux; often terrifically slow, sometimes very fast. The societies of antiquity remained the same for thousands of years, whereas the world of today is changing at breakneck speed, according to CNN. Increasingly the world economy tends to ignore national frontiers. The Internet, satellite TV, videos and CD’s help to foster a globalized culture mixed with local cultures. For the time being, American TV-series, American movies, popular music and paperbacks, dominate globalized culture and lifestyle and American Big Tech companies do everything they can to channel consumers to buy products that will bring in even more profits. However, in the struggle for supremacy in the domain of food, Italian pizzas and pastas, Mexican tortillas and Spanish tapas, and Chinese, Indonesian, Vietnamese, Japanese and Thai food seem to mount an ever-growing competition for American Burgers and Donuts. So far, this world-wide competition, globalization has created fusion recipes and internationally mixed meals that, all over the world, have pushed restaurants that serving local food into the background, or, at best, into a niche existence.

Globalization does not hamper individualization. Far from it: it helps to free people from their local environment with all its old traditions. It offers them more options for a career and a personal lifestyle. Individualization is also stimulated by other forms of modernization such as the processes of liberalization and democratization that emerged in the sixties and the seventies, which in turn were pushed ahead by a process of secularization and de-institutionalization. The loss of the traditional authority of church leaders and the assent of a new liberal and hedonistic ideology made room for thought and reflection, and for very personal choices, choices to leave your own family, your own social network, your community, religion, culture or nation. But this freedom soon turned into an obligation to be continuously aware of all one’s options. Instead of imposing opinions on somebody else, one was asked to answer the question: ‘What do you think of this?’ The great difference with earlier epochs is that one is no longer obliged to opt for a total package based on a specific religion. Nowadays we can, and in a way, we have to choose from a fixed but variegated supply produced by various subcultures and life styles. This leads to the emergence of all kinds of new and unexpected combinations, so that everybody can confirm or reconfirm his own identity.

Postmodernist research nicely fits into this situation. Usually it is descriptive, imaginative and qualitative and seems to prove over and over again that there is an abundance of different cultures, subcultures and lifestyles that co-exist in the same geographical and social space. Important elements of post-modern thinking are plurality, individual authenticity and uniqueness, cultural and philosophical relativism and historicism. All this leads to the conclusion that postmodernists have developed a sharp eye for what makes people, groups and subcultures different. They do not show much interest in what people share nor in the question of the universals of mankind.

11.8.1       Habermas contra Lyotard

Habermas strongly opposes the postmodernist critique of the Enlightenment. Like many other postmodernists, Lyotard started as a Marxist, but soon doubts began to haunt him. Together with other sceptical Marxists he started the political movement Socialism or Barbarism. This movement realized that Marxism, despite its emancipatory intentions, had committed unforgivable crimes by claiming universal validity for its totalitarian dogmas. Everywhere, where Marxists seized power, ideology degenerated into a violent institution that has no consideration whatsoever with any deviant opinion. Marxism generates injustice and covers up all conflicts between its leaders and the workers. Habermas concluded that all these failures could not be accounted for by unfortunate contingencies of history, but resulted from some serious fallacies inherent in Marxist theory.[68] As a left-wing intellectual Lyotard had no trust in capitalism and lost all confidence in Western civilization. The horrific concentration camps of the Nazis and the Gulag Archipelago had made him suspicions of any theory that claimed to offer a valid recipe for a just society. Hence he denounced any attempt to search for a historical, philosophical or ethical foundation for justice. All these attempts would lead to universal pretences and turn into the enforced imposition of ideas upon anyone with alternative views. Lyotard urges us to abandon all narratives that sketch a grand history or an immanent and unstoppable development of history that promises a splendid future for mankind. To him, the project of modernization is lost, not because history recently has generated a few horrific political disasters, but because such disasters are part and parcel of each grandiose political theory of society that claims universal validity.

Habermas believes that the project of modernization, although it has gone astray, can still be put back on track and redirected towards a satisfying end. He envisions a solution in a further modernization of the project of Enlightenment and favours the broadening of rationality into a communicative rationality. Although science and technology have produced serious collateral damage, Habermas does not yet abandon the project of modernization. Postmodernist philosophers stress that our insights are culturally conditioned, in particular regarding social phenomena. They only accept temporal and local truths. They urge traditional scientific knowledge to make room for other sources of insight. Instead of assuming the possibility of universal truths it stresses theoretical pluralism, based on ontological plurality. Marx, Durkheim, and Weber were convinced that it was possible to find objective truths, but in post-modern epistemology such a model of a neutral and objective observation becomes laughable. Language and theory are no pure descriptions of reality but interventions in reality. Language, science, and art are completely permeated by and interconnected with social historical events. To large degree, Habermas agrees with this relativistic view of social science, but he persists in aiming for objective truths and for the right praxis that can lead to the emancipation of the repressed.

Postmodernists castigate Habermas for his strong emphasis on rationality and seems to ignore that people also have strong emotions and physical needs.[69] In contrast, post-modern thinking is full of Nietzschean and psychoanalytic motives, such as erotic desires, a craving for recognition and the awareness and fear of mortality.[70] Habermas rejects the main tenets of postmodernists, whose only hope appears to be based on irrational outbursts of emotional and physical energy. Although he does not underestimate the liberating potential of modern subcultures and life styles, he thinks that there are better means for overcoming instrumental rationality. Habermas insists on a continued fight against the dominance of economic rationality with the help of communicative action and stresses the need for an expansion of human rights and the improvement of democracy. In his view, these values are just as important as the values of individual self-realization.

In contrast to Habermas, Lyotard does not believe in consensus at all. He focuses on dispute and does not expect that it will be possible to solve most disputes and achieve consensus between opponents or different minds. Conflicts, he maintains, are not discussed within a universal set of rules shared by both parties. Rather, opponents often have views and arguments that cannot be expressed in a mutually shared idiom.[71] Conflicts tend to be accompanied by injustice and an unequal distribution of power. Injustice cannot be lifted, because the discourse of the victim is not acknowledged by the discourse of the other party. The dominant party does not accept other styles of arguing. For Lyotard there is no such thing as non-coercive dialogue, because of the differences of empowerment that will exist. However, Lyotard seemed to overlook those important moments in history in which power has be taken away from the oppressors and been put in the hands of democratic governments. In these instances the views and arguments of the oppressed have gained dominance despite the forces that wanted to keep them down.

There are more important differences. Whereas the notion of an autonomous, rational subject is upheld by Habermas and safeguarded against the dominance of instrumental reason with the help of communicative actions, Lyotard denounces subjectivity, autonomy and rational action. He considers these notions as dangerously ‘humanistic’ constructions that should be banned from academic discourse as soon as possible. The human being and its image that has been developed in the course of thousands of years, no longer takes up a centre stage position with Lyotard. In his ‘linguistic turn’ he denied the existence of the autonomous, goal-oriented subject who acts on the basis of feelings and intelligence. As a post-structural die-hard, he only acknowledges observable speech acts. In his view, these speech acts or phrases are determined by linguistic structures that surpass the level of individual intentions and individual acts. These sentences and other externalizations of human beings (in his perspective: senders and receivers) are the only valid analytical units, the only observable facts. The essence of the subject will always remain a secret. Everyone who thinks that he has found a universally valid theory threatens to start another universalistic, violent war that aims to destroy all other views. That great danger incited Lyotard to oust the subject from social theory and philosophy. That is why he restricted himself to the analysis of speech acts.

Through a detour, however, the subject reappears, now as a passive victim, who can suffer pain or be damaged by forms of injustice, for which there is no compensation, because there is no tribunal that acknowledges these particular forms of injustice. These cases are not treated in official law or legal handbooks. According to Lyotard, one (a subject I presume) can also become a victim of the legal discourse for compensating the damage that has been done, if the victim fails to participate in the right legal procedures, because it is blocked off by other discourses. Habermas, however, will never forget the individual subject. He is convinced that humans want and must communicate, because they are social beings. They have to express themselves. They have to interact with other people. They have goals, and want to achieve these goals through agreements with fellow human beings. For Habermas, individuals, in principle at least, are capable of understanding other individuals. This, however, is precisely what postmodernists question. They depart from the opposite platform, namely that, deep down, human beings will never understand the other. Everyone’s mind will always remain a black box to the other.

The radical critique of reason worried Habermas so much that he devoted twelve lectures to The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. His strategy was to return to the crossroads where Hegel and the Young Hegelians, Nietzsche and Heidegger made the fateful decisions that had led to this ferocious attack on the Enlightenment, rationality, modernity and the ideas of progress. Though Habermas has severely criticized the dominance of instrumental reason, he never intended to replace rationality with irrationality. On the contrary, he wanted to broaden and elevate subject-centred reason to the thoroughly intersubjectivist paradigm of communicative action. Habermas agrees that instrumental reason was abused for the organization of the holocaust and strategic actions of politics and economics have colonized the lifeworld, but he still thinks that the better half of reason can be regained to create a better world. He will not accept the deadly critique of subject-centred reason, because it serves as a morbid prologue for the fatal demise of western culture. For Habermas, there are many valid reasons to criticize modernity, however, he is not inclined to write off Modernity as postmodernists are so eager to do, but sees it as an unfinished project that needs to be put revitalized. Nor does he want to exchange western culture for a hotchpotch of miscellaneous cultures and lifestyles. Where postmodernists and multiculturalists seem prepared to give up their own culture – lock, stock and barrel – and fervently dip into the salad bowl of cultural diversity, he still is concerned with the core values of western culture and modernity, which he still sees as a healthy, if not a universal basis for a great variety of salads.

With these lectures, Habermas intended to resume and renew the counter-discourse that has accompanied modernity from the start of the Enlightenment. His main focus is on the two paths that lead out of the philosophy of Nietzsche. The first path runs through Heidegger and then to Jacques Derrida, the other through Georg Bataille to Michel Foucault.[72] Habermas argues that Heidegger misses the dialectical interdependence between a historically shaped understanding of the world and the experience and practice within its horizon. He does not ignore that our interpretations of the world are heavily influenced by our culture, by a long process of socialization that has shaped our frame of reference, but holds fast to an autonomous kernel that enables each individual to criticize the culturally precooked interpretations on the basis of reason and personal experiences and maintains that individuals can learn other things than what is taken for granted in their society, subculture or lifeworld. Social practice submits the background knowledge of the lifeworld to an ‘ongoing test’ across the entire spectrum of validity claims. These learning processes may well cast doubt on the adequacy of dominant worldviews and trigger forms of critique that may change unjust social practices. Social scientists can be of help here. They can decipher the pathologies of modern life, transform them into sociological terms and test them through empirical investigations.

11.9  In conclusion

The Late Habermas still is a highly esteemed heir to critical theory. He has attempted to make this legacy fruitful for contemporary problems of society. He decided to bypass important parts of Marxist elements of critical theory, but remained loyal to normative goals, such as equality and the liberation of alienating social forces and social structures. During his career he became convinced that the only alternative for the political left is social democracy. I am sure that must be very disappointed by the fact that European Social Democratic parties lost a big share of their working class electorate to far right parties. It is up to a new generation of social scientist to explain how did happen. To what degree have social democratic parties pushed a very large part of their electorate away towards their political opponents?

Habermas’ political dedication has always been very strong, focused on the transformation of society towards mitigating inequality. Many aspects of his work can be interpreted from this perspective. He was convinced that a thorough study of the causes of social pathologies, mainly caused by the dominance of instrumental reason, deserves the highest priority. Throughout his work he honours Weber’s sharp insight in the process of rationalization as the most crucial element of modernization and Weber’s warnings about the negative consequences of too much rationalization and disenchantment. In the first phase of his career Habermas focused on exposing the manipulative and dehumanizing character of technology and positivistic science. He blamed the strong focus on controlling man and nature. Presently, living under the domination of Big Tech, this has become even more relevant, precisely because most people do not feel being dominated, but simply enjoy their time on social media or playing games.

Though the career of Habermas can be pictured as an endless quest for the exit from this misery, he never fell back on a romanticized myth of the pre-industrial age ‘when existence supposedly was good and people easily satisfied’. Neither did he hold on to the dream of a great socialistic revolution that would produce a new, emancipated and non-alienated human being. Nor could he accept the resignation, stoicism, and cynicism of postmodernists, who appear to be satisfied with an attempt to make the best of life and to enjoy it as long as they can. Habermas kept making plans for the future and looking for solutions for major social problems. He searched for the solution of social conflicts and political disagreement in a further liberalization and democratization of modernity. He thought he had found the answer to these problems in broadening the concept of rationality. In his view, the rapprochement of an ideal speech situation, that is, a situation in which communicative rationality can be realized, would automatically lead to a further democratization, to a greater legitimacy of the legal system, and towards the proper acknowledgement and respect for other cultures and identities. However, he seemed to overlook the fact that a completely free exchange of ideas on the basis of the ideal typical conditions of a power free dialogue may also produce a sharpening of differences of opinion, instead of producing consensus. Of course, this insight does not mean that we should abandon the goal of a real free dialogue. For Habermas, a dialogue without taboos and self-censorship could be an important step on the road to a better functioning of democracy, a greater validity of the legal process and a more peaceful coexistence of ethnic and religious minorities and dominant groups. In view of the current attacks on democratic institutions, reaching this goal has become even more challenging.

[1]  Habermas died 14 March 2026. The last few days I have adapted this text once more, changing present tenses in past tenses wherever it seemed appropriate.

[2]  J. Habermas (P. Dews, ed) (1992) Autonomy and Solidarity. Interviews with Jürgen Habermas. London Verso, p. 96

[3] Robert Wuthnow et al. (1984): Cultural Analysis: The Work of Peter L Berger, Mary Douglas, Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas (p. 179-180). London & New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

[4] J. Keulartz (1992): De verkeerde wereld van Jürgen Habermas. Meppel/Amsterdam: Boom. (p. 13-14.)

[5] J. Habermas (1992): Autonomy and Solidarity (p. 126). London: Verso.

[6] J. Keulartz , o. c.  p 15.

[7] R. Geuss (1981): The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas & the Frankfurt School (pp. 2-3). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[8] J. Habermas (1992): Autonomy and Solidarity. London: Verso.

[9] J. Habermas (1962): Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Darmstadt und Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag. J. Habermas (1989/1992): The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge: Polity Press. (p. 96)

[10] J. Keulartz: o. c, pp. 12-13.

[11] Idem, pp. 36-40.

[12] Idem, pp. 23-24.

[13] J. Habermas (1976): Theory and Practice. London: Heinemann.  p. 198

[14] R. Wuthnow: o. c., pp. 180-181.

[15] M. Jay (1973): The Dialectical Imagination. London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd.

[16] Kant cited by Martin Jay, p. 3.

[17] H. Kunneman & J. Keulartz (1985): Rondom Habermas: Analyses en kritieken. Meppel: Boom.

[18] M. Jay (1973): The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School. o. c.

[19] Idem, pp. 43-44

[20] Idem, p. 45

[21] R.C. Holub (1991): Jürgen Habermas: Critic in the public sphere. London/New York: Routledge.

[22] Idem, p. 27.

[23] J. Habermas (1976): Theory and Practice, o. c.  (p. 254).

[24] H. Hoefnagels (1977): Kritische sociologie. In L. Rademaker & H. Bergman (Eds.) Sociologische stromingen. Utrecht: Aula/Het spectrum.

[25] T. W. Adorno et al. (1950): The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper.

[26] Pierce cited by Jürgen Habermas. In: Knowledge and Human Interest (p.170). London: Heinemann.

[27] Karl R. Popper (1972): Objective Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[28] Th. McCarthy (1981): The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (p.55). Cambridge, Mass.: The mit Press, Cambridge, Mass.

[29] J. Habermas (1965/1973): Kennis und Interesse. In Een keuze uit het werk van Jürgen Habermas. Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus. p. 81-96.

[30] McCarthy: o. c.; p. 56.

[31] Idem, p. 89-90.

[32] Idem, p. 86-87.

[33] B. Flyvbjerg (2001): Making Social Science Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[34] Thomas McCarthy’s book was a great help for writing this section. Thomas McCarthy: The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas. mit-Press: Cambridge Mass. 1981/82.

[35] J. Habermas (1963). Theorie und Praxis. o. c., (p. 254).

[36] Idem 254-255.

[37] J. Habermas & N. Luhmann (1971): Theorie der Gesellshaft oder Sozialtechnologie (p.170). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. (p. 81-96).

[38] J. Habermas: Technology and Society as Ideology, Ibid.

[39] J. Habermas (1971): Toward a Rational Society. Boston: Beacon Press; London: Heinemann (p. 55).

[40] Technische vooruitgang en sociale leefwereld. In: Een keuze uit het werk van Jürgen Habermas. Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus. O. c.

[41] O.c., p. 15,

[42] J. Keulartz: o.c. 178-179.

[43] J. Habermas (1990): Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (p. 305-307). See also the summary of Schmitt’s analysis by Keulartz: Keulartz o. c. p. 171-172.

[44] H. Kunneman (1983): Habermas’ theorie van het communicatieve handelen. Een samenvatting (p. 7). Meppel/Amsterdam: Boom.

[45] Idem

[46] A. Brand (1990): The Force of Reason: An Introduction to Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action (pp. 51-53). Sydney: Allan & Unwin.

[47] Idem, p. 53.

[48] TKH II, p. 447.

[49] TKH II, p. 447.

[50] TKH II, p 580.

[51] See the balance theory of Fritz Heider or the theory of cognitive dissonance of Leon Festinger.

[52] Besides, you could also say something about the linguistic world, but it is better this medium to see as part of the three other worlds.

[53] This example was constructed by Arie Brand, 1990.

[54] There are other alternatives, such as the use of violence or the evasion of an opponent.

[55] A. Brand (1990). The Force of Reason; an Introduction to Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action (pp. 51-53). Sydney: Allan Unwin.

[56] S. Mestrovic, o. c.

[57] J. Habermas, 1986: 386-387, quoted by Brand, p. 133.

[58] A. Gutman (1995) (Ed.). Multiculturalisme (p.7-8).

[59] J. Habermas (1995). Strijd om erkenning in de democratische rechtsstaat. In A. Gutman (Ed.) Multiculturalisme (p. 129). Meppel/Amsterdam: Boom.

[60] Idem, p. 131-132.

[61] Idem, p. 134.

[62] J. Habermas 1995, o. c., p. 135.

[63] J. Habermas 1995, o. c., p. 135.

[64] J. Habermas 1995, o. c. p. 138-139

[65] J. Fishman (1972): Advances in the Sociology of language. The Hague: Mouton. J. Habermas (1995), o. c., p. 152-153.

[66] P. Brassé & W. van Schelven (1980). Assimilatie van vooroorlogse migranten. Den Haag, Staatsuitgeverij.

[67] M. Featherstone (1988): Postmodernism. London: Sage (p. 202-203). 

[68] H. Kunneman (1996): Van Theemutscultuur tot walkman-ego. Contouren van een postmoderne individualiteit (p. 106-107). Meppel/Amsterdam: Boom.

[69] In fact, Mestrovic asserts, the same is true for postmodernists. S. Mestrovic (1991). The coming fin de siècle, London/New York: Routledge.

[70] Kunneman ; o. c.

[71] J.-F. Lyotard (1986): Le Différend (p.24). Paris: Minuit.

[72] Th. McCarthy (1987): Introduction in Jürgen Habermas: The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.